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 This study examines the years 1783-1812 in order to identify how the 
Founders’ strategic visions of an American navy were an extension of the debate over 
the newly forming identity of the young republic.  Naval historiography has both 
ignored the implications of a republican navy and oversimplified the formation of the 
navy into a bifurcated debate between Federalists and Republicans or “Navalists” and 
“Antinavalists.”  The Founders’ views were much more complex and formed four 
competing strategic visions-commerce navy, coastal navy, regional navy, and capital 
navy.  The thematic approach of this study connects strategic visions to the narrative 
of the reestablishment of the United States Navy within the context of international 
and domestic events.  This approach leaves one with a greater sense that the early 
national period policymakers were in fact fledgling naval visionaries, nearly one 
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 Samuel Smith slowly rose from his seat to address his fellow Representatives.  
The Republican from Maryland was a respected veteran of the Revolutionary War, but 
having held himself from the debate as long as he could, he was too exasperated with his 
fellow Congressmen to stay silent any longer.1  Reminding his colleagues that at least 
eleven American merchant ships had been captured by Algerine raiders, the successful 
merchant was disgusted that his fellow Republicans were reluctant to provide any 
protection for the nation’s commerce.  Surely a republic could provide this minimal 
amount of protection for its citizens.  Smith was sure that “this defen[s]eless state” of 
America “was contrary to the maxims of the Republics of all former ages.”2 
 In February 1794, Smith was part of a much broader debate than how the young 
republic would respond to the depredations of Barbary corsairs upon American 
commerce in the Atlantic and Mediterranean.  The naval question was a byproduct of the 
larger question over the direction the republic’s economy should take, and ultimately 
what the proper role of commerce was in a republic.3  Naval historians have traditionally 
focused on the Founders’ arguments over the proper role of a military in a republic. The 
Founders did wrestle with each other over the meaning of a republican military, but in the 
early 1790s that debate was only one part of the broader contest between policymakers 
over the direction American society should take, more specifically, the proper balance 
                                                 
1 Frank A. Cassell, Merchant Congressman in the Young Republic:  Samuel Smith of Maryland, 1752-1839 
(Madison:  The University of Wisconsin Press, 1971), 12-31. 
2 Cassell, Merchant Congressman, 37-43; U.S. Congress, Annals of the Congress of the United States, 42 
vols. (Washington, DC, 1834-56), 3rd Congress, 1st sess., pp. 447.  Hereafter cited as Annals of Congress. 
3 Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic:  Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill:  The 




between commerce and agriculture.4 
 A brief inspection of the example of Marylander Samuel Smith will demonstrate 
that the debate over a republican navy in 1794 should not be separated from its economic 
context.  To do so is to perpetuate the myth that continental defense motivated the 
reestablishment of the navy.  Nothing could be further from the truth.  In the 1790s, 
policymakers like Benjamin Williams from North Carolina did not fear an invasion by 
Great Britain or France because as he noted, “we were three or four thousand miles 
distant from them.”5  Often lost amidst the exciting exploits of the young United States 
Navy in the Caribbean in 1799-1800 and along the Barbary Coast from 1801-1805 is the 
fact that these ships were defending American overseas commerce.  In fact, the first 
resolution creating the naval force in 1794 read, “That a naval force, adequate to the 
protection of the commerce of the United States against the Algerine corsairs, ought to be 
provided.”6  
 In the late 1790s, during the tension-filled years of the Quasi War, while some 
policymakers began to voice the first concerns over coastal defense, many more 
representatives were still thinking foremost about the security of commerce.  It is 
important to remember that by definition, “commerce” for elites did not necessarily equal 
free markets, but usually represented the idea of foreign trade.  In the late eighteenth 
century most economic theorists argued that the expansion of overseas trade was the key 
                                                 
4 McCoy, The Elusive Republic, 174; The Founders is used here in a broad sense to encompass the 
convention of 1787 through 1812.  For a similar example of a broad usage of “the Founders” see Bruce 
Ackerman, The Failure of the Founding Fathers:  Jefferson, Marshall, and the Rise of Presidential 
Democracy (Cambridge:  Belknap Press, 2005). 
5 Annals of Congress, 4th Congress, 1st sess., 873. 




to a nation’s economic health.7  This continued concern over commerce was consistent 
with President John Adams’ declaration on May 16, 1797, that if the republic’s 
commerce was not secure, “Any serious and permanent injury to commerce would not 
fail to produce the most embarrassing disorders. To prevent it from being undermined 
and destroyed is essential…”8 
 The second myth that Samuel Smith’s example undermines is the 
historiographical construction of the stereotype that all Antifederalists or Republicans 
opposed standing armies and the creation of a permanent naval establishment, while their 
opponents, the Federalists, all championed strong armies and navies as one facet of their 
larger conception of a strong central government.9  The conventional interpretation 
teaches us that Republicans opposed strengthening the central government and expanding 
its powers, which included the establishment of standing armies in peacetime.  
Additionally, many Republicans also advocated the virtues of an agrarian economy and 
viewed the over-commercialization of American society as a vice that would corrupt the 
ideals of republicanism.  Commerce was acceptable as long as it was in proper balance 
with agriculture.10  So, for these agrarian-minded policymakers, the establishment of a 
national navy was indicative of the overemphasis of commerce and posed the added 
threat of heavy taxation in order to support never-ending ship-building programs.   
 The reality was much more complex.  Republicans from the Middle Atlantic 
States, such as the Baltimore merchant Samuel Smith, represented the commercial 
                                                 
7 Mlada Bukovansky, Legitimacy and Power Politics:  The American and French Revolutions in 
International Political Culture (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 2002), 139. 
8 James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897 10 
vols.  (Washington, DC, 1896-99), http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/1/0/8/9/10894/10894.txt, (accessed 
online April 20, 2006).  Hereafter referred to as Messages and Papers of the Presidents. 
9 Saul Cornell, The Other Founders:  Anti-Federalism and the Dissenting Tradition in America, 1788-1828 
(Chapel Hill:  The University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 28-42. 




interests of the merchant class and in some ways had more in common with mercantile 
Federalists from Massachusetts than with other Middle Atlantic and Southern 
Republicans.11  These men were concerned with securing the nation’s commerce and 
endeavored to convince their fellow agrarians that what was good for commerce was 
good for agriculture.12  For these policymakers, a commerce navy represented a valid 
vision of a navy in a republic because commerce was a key component to the stability of 
the republic. 
 By undertaking a fresh investigation into the meaning of a republican navy we 
uncover the fallacy of a third myth.  Historians under the influence of Mahan’s broad 
shadow often regard the influential scholar as the nation’s first significant naval 
strategist.  However, when we examine the complex and nuanced debates of 
policymakers from 1783 to 1812 over the kind of navy befitting a republic we find that 
the Founders were in fact offering several distinct, coherent naval strategies.  Their 
strategies were firmly grounded in the financial limits of the nation, its economic 
interests, the reality of the United States’ position amidst the powers of Europe, and the 
contested ideals and virtues of a republican government.  Often these factors contradicted 
one another and lent a confused character to Congress’ voice, but out of this cacophony 
of voices four strategies emerged and took turns directing the naval policy during the first 
thirty years of the nation’s existence.  These strategic visions of a republican navy took 
four general forms:  Commerce Navy, Coastal Navy, Regional Navy, and Capital Navy.13   
These four strategic visions directed U. S. naval policy during the first thirty years of the 
                                                 
11 Cornell, The Other Founders, 176; Annals of Congress, 4th Congress, 1st sess., 873. 
12 Annals of Congress, 4th Congress, 1st sess., 870. 
13 It should also be noted that some Founders wanted no navy at all, a subject that will be addressed.  
“Capital navy” refers to navies composed of “capital ships” (ships-of-the-line boasting in excess of 70 




republic, from 1783 to 1812.  Five phases of strategic policy can be discerned from the 
years between the American Revolution and the War of 1812:  a period of no naval 
establishment from 1783 to 1793, a commerce navy from 1794 to 1796, a regional navy 
from 1797 to 1800 (with a push towards a capital navy from 1799 to 1800), a commerce 
navy again from 1801 to 1805, and finally a coastal navy from 1806 to 1812.  During 
these years, the strategic visions were hardly monolithic or hegemonic.  There was little 
consensus on naval policy in the early republic, and debates over the republic’s navy 
were often long and acrimonious.  However, despite the variety of opinion regarding 
naval strategy in the new republic, these five phases represent the visions most 
representative of the official direction being taken by the new United States Navy in its 
first three decades. 
 Beyond taking a fresh look at the narrative of the early U. S. naval establishment, 
it is important to understand how the evolution of the U. S. Navy was a part of the debate 
over republicanism in the new nation.  Seeking to understand the meaning of 
republicanism, scholarship on the early national period has flourished in the past few 
decades, expanding its scope to include the complex cultural and societal dynamics of 
late eighteenth century America.   Scholarship has often overlooked the U.S. Navy as an 
important part of this understanding of republicanism and national identity.  As Franklin 
Roosevelt wrote, “the early Navy played a notable part in the development of the national 
spirit…It may therefore be said that in many senses our naval forces…were among the 
important makers of the Nation.”14  Yet, while an “important and innovative new work” 
in the early national period emerges seemingly every other month, fresh works 
                                                 
14 Dudley Knox, ed., Naval Documents Related to the Quasi War between the United States and France, 7 




incorporating the U.S. Navy into the broader fabric of the early republican experience are 
almost nonexistent.  While contemporary historians are redefining our understanding of 
the republic in the early national period, the navy as a manifestation of republican 
identity has been overlooked, perhaps viewed by academic history as an inconsequential 
offspring of military history. 
 Military history itself is partly to blame.  Nearly all of the early scholarly works 
on the formation of the U.S. Navy breeze through the early years of the service and 
perpetuate the standard myth that the debate over the navy’s creation was a simple 
partisan battle between pro-navy Federalists and their anti-navy opponents, the so-called 
Antifederalists and their progeny, the Jeffersonian Republicans.  Even though these 
histories overlook the fact that the Founders’ arguments were much more nuanced than 
this simple black and white painting, a greater shortcoming is that their approach tends to 
oversimplify or ignore the more important question of the implications of a republican 
navy altogether.  By failing to connect the creation of the navy to the larger debate over 
the meaning of republicanism, historians have often misinterpreted the strategies and 
visions behind the creation of the U.S. Navy and have oversimplified what was a part of a 
complex discussion of the role of militaries in a republic. 
 The Founders faced many questions.  If the young republic was to create a navy, 
how would it do so?  How could this navy be a servant of the republic and not an agent of 
its demise?  Would it protect commerce in foreign seas, or stay close to America as a 
coastal defense force?  Would it defend America’s interests among the European navies, 
or would it enforce a U.S. claim of hegemony in the Americas?   The historiography of 




that Federalists and Republicans were at odds with each other over the very idea of 
whether a navy was a proper instrument of a republic, but the Founders’ concepts of a 
navy’s purpose demands more illumination.  What was the Founders’ strategic vision and 
did they envision the republic’s navy being used for coastal defense, as a regional force, 
or as an international force?  How did these visions shape the form the U.S. Navy took 
during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century?  The Founders were in uncharted 
waters.  Not only were they debating the concept of republican armies and navies, but 
policymakers were engaged in a precarious experiment that many worried would lead to 
disunion and the establishment of a European-style collection of competing states.15   In 
that light, we must ask how competing visions of the purpose of a republican navy 
reflected the contested formation of the new republic.  
 This study examines the years 1783-1812 in order to identify how the Founders’ 
strategic visions of an American navy in the late eighteenth century were an extension of 
the debate over the newly forming identity of the young republic.  Traditionally, naval 
historiography has both ignored the implications of a republican navy and oversimplified 
the formation of the navy to a bifurcated debate between Federalists and Republicans or 
“Navalists” and “Antinavalists.”16  However, to gain a more complete understanding of 
the debate over the identity of the new republic it is important to recognize the 
complexity of the competing visions of a U. S. naval force, each revealing a slightly 
different concept of the purpose of a republic’s navy.  This study aims to do this by 
                                                 
15 James E Lewis, Jr., The United States and the Collapse of the Spanish Empire:  The American Union and 
the Problem of Neighborhood, 1783-1829 (Chapel Hill:  The University of North Carolina Press, 1998). 
16 For an example of the Federalist vs. Republican argument see Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of 
American Naval Power, 1776-1918 (Annapolis:  Naval Institute Press, 1939) and Marshall Smelser, The 
Congress Founds the Navy, 1787-1798 (Notre Dame, IN:  University of Notre Dame Press, 1959).  For the 
origin of the “navalists vs. antinavalists” thesis see Craig L. Symonds, Navalists and Anitnavalists:  The 





expanding the traditional binary interpretations into a four-part explication, focusing on 
the four major strategic visions of a republican navy offered by policymakers from 1783 
to 1812.  The framework of this study departs from the historiography in another notable 
way by forgoing the standard approach of explaining the reestablishment in a traditional 
chronological narrative format.  Instead, the thematic approach of this study connects 
strategic visions to the narrative to demonstrate the coherence of policymakers’ 
arguments.  The context of the international and domestic events surrounding the debates 
of policymakers over the role of a navy will be noted throughout the study.  By reducing 
the emphasis on the chronology, however, one is able to better grasp the continuity of 
these visions over time.  The danger of the traditional narrative is that it subsumes the 
strategic visions of the Founders beneath the weight of “important events,” the very thing 
this study endeavors to avoid. 
 The four major visions of a navy-commerce navy, coastal navy, regional navy, 
and capital navy-encapsulated specific visions representing special meanings for 
Federalists and Republicans alike; meanings that transcended their vision for the 
American navy and act as a window into their conceptions of a republican identity.  
Expanding from naval historiography’s binary interpretation is not only more accurate, 
but also better describes the variety of views of the Founders whose positions on the 
creation of a navy were not as simple as black or white, pro or con.  By understanding the 
complexity of their arguments and visions one gains a greater appreciation for these men 
as fledgling late eighteenth and early nineteenth century naval strategists, and one is 
struck by the realization that the debate over the purpose of an American navy was as 




ships and iron cannons. 
The Four Strategic Visions 
 The emphasis of this study on the four strategic visions of the Founders builds on 
the past three decades of scholarship by a new generation of innovative naval historians.  
Incorporating the tenets of the new military history, these historians have used cultural, 
social, and political contexts to challenge the dominant binary interpretation of early 
American naval policy.  Craig Symonds is one such scholar who corrects historians’ 
understanding of the Federalist-Republican debates by arguing that Republicans such as 
Thomas Jefferson did not believe navies to be simply a waste of time and money for an 
indebted nation.17  Rather, Symonds demonstrates that the Republicans opposed the 
formation of a capital navy for the purpose of national prestige and leverage; they feared 
the inherent risks accompanying the creation of such a navy, including the large expense, 
unnecessary involvement in European affairs, and possible provocation of hostilities.18  
Symonds’ correction of the historiography extends to his usage of the terms “Navalist” 
and “Antinavalist” to characterize the debates rather than the traditional bifurcation of 
Federalists as pro-navy and Republicans as anti-navy.  His rationale is that historians 
have erred by characterizing Republicans as anti-navy, rather they opposed the kind of 
navy the Navalists offered and hence they are more accurately referred to as anti-
Navalists.19   
 Symonds provides a helpful clarification of the debate over what kind of navy the 
new republic should build, and he adds a great deal of insight into the Founders’ various 
naval visions.  However, his renaming of the key players in the debate with new 
                                                 
17 Symonds, Navalists and Antinavalists, 11. 
18 Ibid., 11-12 




monikers blurs the variety of opinion within the Antinavalist ranks. They certainly 
opposed the dominant Navalist dream of a grand capital navy and the correlating identity 
of a strong American republic asserting its place amidst the powerful monarchies of 
Europe.  However, Antinavalist visions were hardly homogeneous and encompassed 
everything from those who argued that a republic should never maintain a peacetime 
navy, to those who argued for strong coastal and commerce navies.  Additionally, the 
Founders’ visions for a navy were not static ideas; prominent Founders such as Thomas 
Jefferson and John Adams were forced to reevaluate their naval goals depending on the 
situation confronting them.20   
 While Symonds does not ignore these conflicting arguments within the 
Antinavalist Founders, his narrative of the congressional debates and consistent usage of 
“navalist” and “antinavalist” signposts overshadows the level of complexity in the debate 
over the purpose of an American navy.  Antinavalists included policymakers who favored 
a commerce navy to secure American interests overseas and others who advocated a 
coastal force to protect the republic’s shores.  Additionally, contrary to Symonds’ 
analysis, some Republicans were in fact “anti-navy” and argued that a republic should 
never have a navy.  While these policymakers were not the majority, it is misleading to 
ignore the substance of their argument as it offers an important alternative conception of 
the early republic’s identity.  One such example is Virginian John Nicholas who asserted 
that he hoped to never see a navy established because he was certain that “a Navy would 
never do any real good to this country, but would increase the unhappiness of it.”21  
These hardly seem the words of a man who is merely anti-capital navy, and does not 
                                                 
20 Symonds, Navalists and Antinavalists, 19-21. 




seem to fit Symonds’ definition of an “antinavalist.”  It is this complexity of strategic 
vision that reinforces the need to explore the depth of these policymakers’ ideas and how 
they fit into the concept of a republic’s military force. 
 These naval visions were hardly developed in a comfortable incubator free from 
the social, economic, and political realities of the time.  Joseph Henrich, despite his 
traditional binary interpretation of anti-navy Republicans and pro-navy Federalists, 
correctly stresses the importance of ideology in the formation of naval policy.  Navies 
had typically been exempt from the Whig suspicion of standing armies, but this was 
beginning to change by the 1770s when radicals in Great Britain began to view the 
national debt as the most important threat to their liberties.  Naturally, because of their 
large expenditures, the Royal Navy was an easy target for this concern.  Henrich argues 
that through the influence of anti-navy radicals like Joseph Priestley and Thomas Cooper, 
Republicans in the United States adopted similar philosophical and moral positions.22   
However, Henrich goes too far in arguing that ideology and partisan politics of anti-navy 
Republicans and pro-navy Federalists are the sole explanations for the positions of 
policymakers on naval issues during the early republic.23  Despite Henrich’s arguments to 
the contrary, it is clear that policymakers’ naval strategies were often a product of their 
regional and economic backgrounds.  Historians like Harold and Margaret Sprout and 
Marshall Smelser have stressed the divide between northern and southern ideologies, but 
it is more instructive and accurate to examine the actual social contexts of policymakers.  
Southerners representing commercial districts near the coast like Robert Harper and 
Samuel Smith were often ardent supporters of naval expansion, while northerners from 
                                                 
22 Joseph Henrich, “The Triumph of Ideology:  The Jeffersonians and the Navy, 1779-1807,” Ph.D. diss., 
Duke University, 1971, 69-84. 




further inland and agrarian areas of the north were often opponents of naval measures.24  
Regional economic interests were certainly an important factor in the formulation of 
policymakers’ naval strategies.  
 Diplomacy was another key component of the Founders’ naval strategic visions.  
Throughout the Quasi-War, President Adams attempted to negotiate with France in an 
effort to avoid war.  Despite the French rejection of the new American minister Charles 
Cotesworth Pinckney, Adams’ strategic vision of a regional navy allowed for the 
important role of diplomacy in a vigorous attempt to “preserve peace and friendship with 
all nations.”25  Throughout the next two years, Adams refused to declare war on France 
as many demanded, and instead attempted to steer a middle course that could continue to 
allow for the possibility of a diplomatic solution.  The coastal navy vision of Adams’ 
successor, Thomas Jefferson, also depended on non-military measures.  Enacting an 
unpopular embargo in 1807 while Congress built up a coastal navy, Jefferson too 
endeavored to avoid armed conflict with European nations, preferring instead to use 
diplomatic and economic tools to achieve national goals. 
 International and domestic events also played an important role in the formulation 
of early American naval strategy.   Episodes like the depredations of the Barbary States, 
the French Revolution, the Quasi-War, and the Chesapeake-Leopard Affair placed the 
Founders in a position of having to respond to international events that held complex 
ramifications.  Previous to 1798, it was very difficult to enact naval building programs in 
Congress.  However, after the XYZ Affair, not only did Congress create a separate 
                                                 
24 William G. Anderson, “John Adams and the Creation of the American Navy,” Ph.D. diss., State 
University of New York at Stony Brook, 1975, 91-92. 
25 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/10894/10894-h/10894-h.htm, 




Department of the Navy, but in 1799 it laid the foundation for a capital navy.  These 
well-known “big events” forced policymakers to voice their strategic visions and take a 
position on the role of a navy in the young republic.   
 These four strategic visions-commerce navy, regional navy, capital navy, and 
coastal navy-were products of numerous factors, including contingency, international and 
domestic politics, republican ideology, and economic realities.  They were part of a 
broader conception of the Founders’ republican identity and are the focus of this study.   
However, before these strategic visions could give birth to a new naval force, the new 
republic first disbanded its navy and forged into its first ten years with no national naval 
force of any kind.  Technically, the first naval strategic vision of the United States was 












Chapter 1:  A Navy Disbanded, 1783-1793 
 During the first decade of the United States’ existence, policymakers who 
believed that the new republic had no need of a naval force succeeded in working their 
vision into American naval policy.  In August 1785, despite achieving unexpected 
success against the British Navy during the Revolution, the Alliance, the final ship of the 
Continental Navy, was sold because many in Congress considered a navy to be 
incompatible with the republican ideals, economic realities, and the political objectives of 
the new independent republic.26  Ideologically, the critique of radical British political 
theorists of the 1770s had an impact on how many Americans situated a navy in their 
republican ideology.   Additionally, the economic condition of the republic was not one 
conducive towards naval building programs.  As Robert Morris, agent of marine and 
chief administrator of the Continental Navy wrote Congress on July 10, 1783 
Until Revenues for the Purpose can be obtained it is but vain to talk of Navy or 
Army or any thing else.  We receive sounding Assurances from all Quarters and 
we receive scarce any thing else.  Every good American must wish to see the 
United States possessed of a powerful fleet but perhaps the best way to obtain one 
is to make no Effort for the Purpose till the People are taught by their Feelings to 
call for and require it.  They will now give money for Nothing.27 
 
As Elizabeth Nuxoll has demonstrated, this statement by Robert Morris illustrated a 
“nationalist” naval policy at the end of the American Revolution that anticipated a future 
creation of a new, powerful United States Navy, but recognized that current economic 
and political obstacles were too great at the present for the establishment of such a force.  
Rather, many of the nationalist Founders who desired a naval force set out to create a 
                                                 
26 Elizabeth M. Nuxoll, “The Naval Movement of the Confederation Era,” in The Early Republic and the 
Sea:  Essays on the Naval and Maritime History of the Early United States, ed. William S. Dudley and 
Michael J. Crawford (Washington, DC:  Brassey’s Inc., 2001), 9. 
27 Robert Morris, The Papers of Robert Morris, 9 vol., edited by E. James Ferguson (Pittsburgh:  University 




political and economic climate in the new republic that could give birth to a strong navy 
at some point in the future.28 
 The question of how a navy fit into a republican idea of government was just one 
element of the debate over what role a military would play in the new nation.  Richard 
Kohn argues that when this debate emerged in 1783, American citizens and policymakers 
drew upon experiences dating back to the 1680s, that included European conflicts, Indian 
wars, the Seven Years’ War, and of course, the American Revolution.  He maintains that 
these experiences had fixed in the American mind the proper relationship of martial 
issues with the public and state, and that these events during the colonial period helped 
shaped the naval and military debates in the first two decades of the new nation’s 
existence.29 
 The first way these experiences manifested themselves was represented by 
Samuel Adams’s 1776 declaration that  
[a] Standing Army, however necessary it may be at some times, is always 
dangerous to the Liberties of the People.  Soldiers are apt to consider themselves 
as a Body distinct from the rest of the Citizens…Such a Power should be watched 
with a jealous Eye.”30   
 
The roots of this fear lay in the radical Whig political thought that feared a return to the 
strife in England from 1620-1689 over a Crown-Parliament contest for control of the 
English army.  Whig pamphleteers like John Trenchard countered that a militia, 
populated with men who had a stake in society and liberty was the answer to the standing 
army.31  While this argument originally exempted navies from this assessment, by the late 
                                                 
28 Nuxoll, “The Naval Movement of the Confederation Era,” 3 
29 Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword:  The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in 
America, 1783-1802 (New York:  The Free Press, 1975), 1. 
30 Quoted in ibid., 2. 




1770s radicals in Britain were beginning to lump the Royal Navy into their tirades against 
tyranny because of its contributions to the large increases in national debt.32 
For many Americans, personal experience had reinforced the Whig philosophy that 
tyranny and despotism went hand in hand with a large peacetime standing army.  In this 
analysis, standing armies were a threat to overthrow legitimate governments, enforce the 
will of a despotic ruler, or persecute a civilian populace.33  In the twenty-first century age 
of professional armies and navies, it is hard to fully grasp the fear that Americans had of 
the European military system.  However, the classic image of the eighteenth century 
European army in American consciousness was that of the Hessian, the professional, yet 
brutal society of warriors hired by Great Britain to fight their colonists in North America.  
This was the quintessential highly disciplined army and subservient not to a national 
constitution, but to an aristocratic ruler.  While in the late eighteenth century, European 
armies such as that of Great Britain were beginning to change to reflect the new values of 
the Enlightenment, for most Americans it was the stereotype of the brutal, plundering, 
liberty-hating Hessian army that was to be avoided at all costs.34  Often, in the colonial 
experience, the British Army was little better.  From Bacon’s Rebellion of 1676 in 
Virginia, to Leisler’s Rebellion during 1689-1691 in New York, to the American 
Revolution, Americans were taught that standing armies were a threat to freedom.35 
 One group of Americans, however, did not emerge from the American Revolution 
with the same republican disdain for professional armies and navies.  Rather, the 
                                                 
32 Henrich, “The Triumph of Ideology,” 65-75. 
33 Kohn, Eagle and Sword, 3-4. 
34 David Hackett Fischer, Washington’s Crossing (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2004), 33-40, 52-
59; Kohn, Eagle and Sword, 2. 
35 The U. S. Constitution reflects this fear, and the use of Federal soldiers and sailors remains an issue even 
in twenty-first century America, as demonstrated by criticism of President Bush’s use of the U. S. Army, 




experience of many of the Founders during the Revolution had taught that militias were 
undependable, inefficient, and seldom victorious when confronted by a professional 
army.  These leaders, including George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, John Adams, 
Henry Knox, James McHenry, Timothy Pickering, and Benjamin Stoddert, recognized 
the benefits of professional military forces, and their Revolutionary experience in turn 
shaped how they approached the establishment of both a republic and a military force.  
During the 1790s, these men emerged as some of the foremost advocates of a national 
military establishment.36 
 When the Continental Congress put Robert Morris in charge of the Continental 
Navy in 1781, he faced several obstacles.  Financially, amidst a deepening economic 
depression, the confederation of states faced the daunting challenge of paying off large 
debts.37  The fact that the government under the Articles of Confederation had little 
power to raise revenue only compounded the situation and further undermined the future 
of America’s revolutionary navy.  Eighteenth century navies were indeed expensive 
operations.  A typical 74-gun ship-of-the-line required over 3000 loads of oak and 400 
loads of elm plus trees tall enough to produce its large masts.  By 1797 the average life 
span of one of these ships could be as few as ten years due to the dreaded “dry rot.”38  
Not surprisingly, Robert Morris lamented in July 1783 that as long as America lacked 
financial resources, talk of building a navy was pointless.  Believing that the republic 
needed a “powerful fleet,” yet faced with fiscal realities, Morris was forced to 
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recommend the selling off of the last of the ships of the Continental Navy, admitting that 
“the public Wants and Distresses are so numerous and so urgent…that it becomes 
necessary to cut off every possible Source of Expense.”39 
 This did not stop Morris from proposing a plan to fund both the national debt and 
expand the small Continental Navy.  In his budget address of July 30, 1782, Morris 
explained his plan and also voiced his concept of what a republican navy should do. 
According to Morris’ strategic vision, the navy would protect the sovereignty of 
America’s coastline by forcing enemy fleets to concentrate their ships for their own 
security and thereby prevent a blockade of coastal trade.  The navy would also be a 
cruising navy in the mold of John Adams’ regional navy (see chapter 3).   A cruising 
navy would not just hover close to shore, but would protect American commerce by 
ranging out from the coastal United States to bother foreign commerce in time of conflict, 
and keep sea lanes open for free trade and communication.  Practically, Morris’ plan 
called for building six ships a year and a 1783 budget of $2.5 million, but Congress did 
not share his vision and only authorized $300,000.40  Discouraged by repeated setbacks, 
Morris began to trim the Continental Navy.41 
 John Paul Jones approached Morris in October 1783 about reorganizing the navy.  
Morris was in the process of resigning his post as agent of marine, and he forwarded 
Jones’ proposal to Congress where it was never formally introduced.  Only a draft of 
Jones’ proposal remains, but it seems that he wanted to maintain a fleet for training 
purposes in order to develop a proper officer corps.42  Jones did succeed in convincing 
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Thomas Jefferson in 1785 to back a plan for Jones to command a squadron to protect 
American trade from Algerian commerce raiders, but like his 1783 proposal, nothing ever 
became of the plan.43 
 The Constitutional Convention was the scene of the next debate over the role of 
the navy in the new republic.  Nationalists, now known as “Federalists,” were intent on 
making the government’s right to establish peacetime armies and navies explicit in the 
new Constitution.  Gouverneur Morris even went so far as to propose the creation of a 
separate cabinet position for a secretary of marine, but this was not included in the final 
draft.44   The first draft of the Constitution completed by the Committee of Detail (John 
Rutledge, Edmund Randolph, James Wilson, Oliver Ellsworth, and Nathaniel Gorham) 
and presented to the Convention on August 6, 1787, authorized the Legislature “to make 
war; to raise armies; and to build and equip fleets.”45  The significant verbiage here is 
“fleets.”  This was no simple authorization of a nebulous naval force, but a clear mandate 
to the future Congress to build a capital navy.  However, this provision did not survive 
and was not included in the amended draft of September 10, 1787.  The September draft 
substituted the specific direction “to build and equip fleets” with the more general 
provision to “provide and maintain a navy,” which illustrated the Convention’s reluctance 
to commit to a particular naval strategic vision.46  However, a second change, this one to 
the provision “to raise armies” was telling in that it stipulated that “no appropriation of 
money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years.”  The fear of a tyrannical 
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peacetime army was still strong, and was reflected in the Constitution’s final iteration.  
But, in the minds of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention navies did not pose 
this same threat.  
 After the Constitutional Convention established the right of the Federal 
government to establish the United States Navy, proponents of a naval force from 1788 
through 1793 were largely resigned to the fact that other more pressing national matters 
needed attention before a navy could be created.  As Elizabeth Nuxoll notes, creating a 
sense of national unity, a federal government whose legitimacy was recognized, solving 
the problems of wartime debt, and strengthening the new national economy were 
acknowledged to be more immediate priorities.47  Most importantly, American overseas 
commerce was still relatively safe.  For the moment, American commerce around the 
Mediterranean was still enjoying protection from Algerian raiders by the Portuguese 
Navy.  France and Great Britain were not formally at war with each other and 
impressments and neutrality of trade concerns were not the issues they were to become in 
the 1790s and 1800s when the French Revolutionary Wars reignited fighting between 
France and Britain in 1793. 
 Another circumstance that explains the absence of naval force from 1785 until the 
Naval Act of 1794 is that many policymakers simply did not believe that a naval force 
was compatible with the goals and ideals of a republic. This is one way that the “navalist 
vs. antinavalist” thesis is misleading, because it obscures the existence of an important 
group of representatives who opposed the very idea of a navy.  Craig Symonds describes 
the debate over the establishment of a navy as one between navalists, or what can be 
more accurately called supporters of a capital navy strategic vision, and men like Gallatin 
                                                 




and Jefferson who he claims were not anti-navy, but anti “big” or capital navy.48  This is 
an important point, but it still neglects the fact that an important voice in the early 
republic was the one arguing against a navy in all forms.  These isolationist and 
Antifederalist/Republican policymakers enjoyed a period of ten years from 1783 to 1793 
when their naval vision held sway.  The following chapter describes the strategic vision 
that supplanted the “no-navy” policy in 1794, but even as the tide of opinion in Congress 
and the nation turned against them, the anti-navy policymakers did not just quietly 
acquiesce.  In 1797, 1798, and even 1807, the anti-navy clique continued to remind their 
peers in Congress why the republic was making a grave mistake by instituting various 
naval strategic visions. 
 One of the foremost of these men was William Giles, the Antifederalist and 
Republican representative from Virginia.  A strong supporter of Jefferson and vocal 
opponent of Hamilton, Giles was the classic representative from a rural region who was 
determined to defend republican principles against the centralization and strengthening of 
the national government.  When Giles began his congressional service in 1790 he was 
placed on the Committee for Military Affairs, putting him in prime position to oppose the 
military increases proposed by various Federalists.49  Consistently from 1794 to 1797 he 
articulated an anti-navy stance, best characterized by his declaration in February 1794 
that “he considered navies altogether as very foolish things” and responsible for ruining 
many strong nations.50    
 In March, Giles explained his opposition to the commerce navy vision being 
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offered by some of his peers as being two-fold.  First, while he was willing to admit that 
America’s overseas commerce needed protection, Giles did not believe that a naval force 
was the best way to protect commerce.  Secondly, he was opposed to all national naval 
strategies because they meant the creation of a permanent naval establishment.51  Giles 
declared that “the question of a permanent naval establishment was one of the most 
important which could be presented” and he feared “that the most serious consequences 
were necessarily connected with it.”  In the opinion of anti-navy policymakers like Giles, 
a naval establishment would entangle American in the affairs of Europe and “possess the 
greatest tendency to war.”52  Additionally, Giles echoed the radicals in Britain who 
argued that permanent naval forces were “the most expensive of all means of defen[s]e” 
and “the expensiveness of [the] machinery” of governments was the root cause of 
tyranny.  In Giles’ opinion, “there is no device which facilitates the system of expense 
and debts so much as a Navy.”53  Specifically, for the crisis at hand, Giles preferred 
diplomacy, such as paying off the Dey of Algiers, to any kind of naval or military 
solution.  Giles is the perfect illustration of a policymaker who was not an Antinavalist, 
because his “strong objection to the establishment of a Navy” clearly demonstrates his 
anti-navy republican vision.  The consistency of Giles’ opposition is further proof of his 
position, as he reiterated his anti-naval message in1797 when the commerce debate had 
shifted to the problem of French attacks on American commerce.54  Giles would not 
relent on his anti-navy position until 1801 when the “emergency” of Tripoli’s declaration 
of war upon the United States led him to support the use of existing naval vessels to 
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protect American overseas commerce.55 
 Giles was joined in 1797 by Republican John Nicholas of Virginia who was a 
policymaker that further illustrated the problematic nature of the thesis that Antinavalist 
policymakers did want a naval force of some kind in the future, but just did not think the 
republic was ready in the 1780s and 1790s.56  It is true that some policymakers made 
such an argument, but others like Nicholas joined Giles in supporting an anti-navy 
republican vision.  For Nicholas it was not a matter of timing, “he did not want to see any 
such establishment” because “a Navy would never do any real good to this country, but 
would increase the unhappiness of it.”  Posing too great an expense and holding doubtful 
benefits, Nicholas was not willing to invest in something that “might be of very 
mischievous consequence to the nation.”57  A year later, Nicholas had not changed his 
tune, still asserting that “[i]t would be perfectly consistent with the honor and 
independence of our country, to say we will have no Navy.”58 
 Many of these anti-navy policymakers were isolationists who feared the 
machinations of the Old World.  Nicholas’ classmate at the College of William and Mary, 
Republican John Heath, not only believed that the effort in 1797 to build more ships 
would “increase our folly and disgrace our councils,” but “he was sorry to see such a 
desire to imitate the practice of monarchal Governments” and “he wished to stand aloof 
from European politics and European broils.”59  Quoting a contemporary philosopher, the 
Philadelphia astronomer David Rittenhouse, the representative from Virginia concluded 
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that he wished “‘Nature would raise her everlasting bars between the new and the old 
world, and make a voyage to Europe as impracticable as one to the moon.’”60  Heath 
believed European influence would pollute the republican experiment, although his 
fellow Virginian John Page believed their experiment could teach Europe some valuable 
lessons about representative government.  Page argued that a peaceful and economically 
successful United States could show the rest of the world that a nation did not need a 
navy.  Accordingly, he moved to immediately sell the three 1794 frigates under 
construction and “show the world that we can be happy without [a navy].”61 
 It made perfect sense to anti-navy policymakers of the 1790s that the United 
States could be economically successful without a navy.  The independent-minded 
Federalist Joshua Coit of Connecticut argued this very thing in February 1797, because as 
he declared four months later “[f]or his part he did not wish [for] a permanent naval 
establishment in this country.”62  One of the foremost anti-navy policymakers, Albert 
Gallatin could not have agreed more.  Gallatin suspected that the commerce navy of 1794 
would turn into a capital navy and Gallatin was “of the opinion that a Navy was not 
essentially necessary to the protection of commerce.”63  The future Secretary of the 
Treasury was always endeavoring to find ways to maximize the few financial resources 
of the young republic, and in his opinion, commerce could be protected through 
diplomacy.  Gallatin was always concerned with protecting the virtue of the agrarian 
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republic and “conceived a Navy to be prejudicial to the true interests of [America].”64  
Craig Symonds argues that Gallatin was not anti-navy, but statements like his declaration 
in 1797 that “he considered a Naval Establishment as highly injurious to the interest of 
this country” hardly persuades one that he was an antinavalist.65  Rather, in Gallatin’s 
mind, the proper course to steer was one of non-partisanship in European affairs, and he 
constantly resisted his peers’ efforts to favor one nation over another.66 
 Gallatin’s primary concerns were ensuring the republic’s financial stability and 
maintaining the independence of the new nation.  These two goals were connected in 
Gallatin’s mind, because legitimacy in international diplomacy would only come when 
America had paid off its outstanding debts.   L. B. Kuppenheimer maintains that Gallatin 
regarded a naval establishment as one of the foremost threats to his goal, regarding navies 
as “offensive weapons, prime instruments for war, debt, and ultimately, tyranny.”67  The 
Maryland Republican Gabriel Christie agreed with Gallatin that commerce could be 
protected by other means.   He was yet another policymaker who was clearly anti-navy 
and not an antinavalist interested in delaying the establishment of a navy until another 
day.  Instead, Christie “trusted he should never see a single armed vessel belong to the 
United States; he hoped also, that his posterity might not.”68 
 Other policymakers were even more radical and argued that the Federal 
government was not obligated to provide any kind of protection for commerce.  John 
Smilie, a Pennsylvania Republican, told his peers in 1807 that “[h]e believed there was 
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no country on earth whose commerce would justify the creation of a navy merely for its 
protection.”  To the shock of policymakers with ties to the merchant community, Smilie 
countered that “[h]e would rather, therefore, give up the whole trade than protect it by a 
navy.”  Not only was Smilie opposed to a commerce navy, but he did not support the 
coastal navy strategic vision being argued in 1807.  He was willing to defend the nation, 
but “he would never consent to defend the country by a fleet.”69  The opposition of anti-
navy policymakers to a commerce navy in 1797 was clear, but some policymakers who 
shared Smile’s sentiments did not believe that coastal defense was a valid reason for 
establishing a navy either.  Page claimed  
That he had said it would be better for the United States that an enemy’s army 
should get into the centre of the country (because we could get rid of it as we had 
done) than that the country should be perpetually taxed to guard against a possible 
invasion.70 
 
Despite the escalation of tensions in 1807 over the attack on the Chesapeake and other 
violations of American sovereignty, anti-navy policymakers like North Carolina 
Republican James Holland were convinced that if the United States had a strong navy, 
they would already be at war.  A naval force was not the solution, and Holland declared 
that he “would not vote a single cent for fortifications or a navy.”71  Others in the anti-
navy camp included Republicans Orchard Cook from Massachusetts and Gideon Olin 
from Vermont.72 
   The historiography of the navy from 1785 to 1794 is thin.  Both early and recent 
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historians of the navy ignore and mischaracterize the Founders’ debates over the 
Revolutionary Navy and its peacetime transition.   Historian Willis Abbot exemplifies 
early scholars who do not mention the naval debates of the 1790s at all in their narratives, 
leaving the reader confused as to how the navy transitioned from the disbanding of the 
Continental Navy in the mid 1780s to the deployment of frigates to the Mediterranean in 
the late 1790s.  Implicit in his silence is the judgment that Congress “awoke” and finally 
ordered the building of some warships.73  Highly celebratory of the growing American 
Navy, Abbot basks in the glories of victorious engagements and is not concerned with 
connecting the military with the political and cultural forces shaping the composition and 
mission of the Navy.  Despite producing an important work on the Continental Navy, 
William Fowler completely mischaracterizes Morris and Congress by arguing that “[b]y 
1783 it was apparent that neither Morris nor Congress had much need for the navy.”74  As 
historian Elizabeth Nuxoll demonstrates, this argument is not supported by the historical 
record.75  Morris and others in Congress wanted to maintain a navy during peacetime, but 
acquiesced to the financial realities of the new nation.   
 Ultimately, the navalist-antinavalist thesis needs to be expanded because it denies 
the existence of the significant anti-navy voice during the early national period.  The 
thesis is correct that some policymakers were antinavalist in the sense that they opposed 
navalists or those who advocated a capital navy.  However, grouping all opponents of 
capital navies into a category of antinavalists misrepresents the position of many 
policymakers who did not desire a naval force of any kind; policymakers whose 
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philosophy was dominant from 1785 to 1793.  Although by 1794 European politics were 
setting in motion a series of event that would bring about a change in America’s naval 
strategy, these anti-navy policymakers continued to voice their dissent throughout the 
first three decades of the new republic.  But, by 1794, their hold over the new nation’s 
naval policy was weakening in the face of threats to what many were beginning to argue 
was the republic’s most important interest:  overseas commerce.  The year 1794 would 




Chapter 2:  Commerce Navy, 1794-1796 and 1801-1805 
 The importance of commerce to the young republic is often overlooked amidst 
historians’ and the public’s nostalgia of American naval victories in the Mediterranean in 
the early nineteenth century.  The republican navy cutting its teeth in the Mediterranean 
was not defending overseas land possessions, but it was defending American possessions 
of another sort.  It is important not overlook the fact that the interests being defended 
were the commercial interests of the republic’s merchant ships.  Advocates of the 
reestablishment of a navy during the Constitutional Convention of 1787 argued that the 
republic needed a naval force to defend the nation’s trade.1  When Alexander Hamilton 
argued in The Federalist, No. 11 that one purpose of a new central government would be 
to establish a naval force, his argument was not founded on the necessity of a coastal 
defense.  Rather, Hamilton argued that commerce was the life blood of the new republic, 
and that a naval force would be crucial for protecting trade and facilitating its growth.2  
This concern over the future of the republic’s commerce continued into the early 1800s, 
as the dialogue over naval defense remained centered on securing the republic’s 
commerce.  Federalists and Republicans alike advocated a commerce navy, although 
Republicans were often suspicious that the Federalists’ true motivation in pushing for a 
commerce navy was to establish the foundations of a capital navy.  However, for both 
Republicans and Federalists the root purpose of the late eighteenth century American 
navy was quite simply the protection of America’s increasingly far-flung commercial 
endeavors.   
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 Prior to the Revolution, the colonies rarely worried about the protection of their 
commerce thanks to the regulations of the Acts of Trade and Navigation and the physical 
presence of the Royal Navy.  After the Revolution, this double-edged sword turned 
against American merchants, who saw their ships seized, their sailors impressed, their 
insurance rates skyrocket, and their markets constricted with the closure of the West 
Indies to American trade in July 1783 by the British government.3  Not only did 
American shipping suffer, but the American shipbuilding industry was seriously 
impacted.  An investigation by Lord Hawkesbury and the Royal Privy Council’s 
Committee on Trade and Plantations determined that while 182 ships were under 
construction in the United States in 1772, by 1789 this number had fallen to only 31.4  
Consequently, during the 1780s, American merchants ranged further and further from 
North America in an effort to escape the British mercantilist system, sending their ships 
to the Mediterranean, the East Indies, the Philippines, and even China.5  While this 
expansion of trade routes helped merchants escape the high duties imposed on American 
trade goods by Great Britain and the European continent, it exposed American 
merchantmen to the dangers posed by pirates and privateers, most notably by the 
commerce raiders of the Barbary Coast. 6 
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 However, during the new nation’s first ten years, from 1783 to 1793, the United 
States faced little external pressure to reestablish a naval force.  World events in 1793 
quickly altered the status quo and provided an opportunity for more naval-minded 
policymakers to voice their strategic visions.  First, France declared war on Great Britain 
on February 1, 1793, instantly calling into question the continued neutrality of America’s 
trade because of the United States’ 1778 Treaty of Amity and Commerce with France.7  
Initially, American trade flourished when France completely opened her West Indian 
trade to America, but this economic boom proved short-lived as the British responded by 
seizing American vessels and impressing American seamen engaged in trade with the 
French colonies.  Upset over the United States’ failure to resist the seizures of its 
commercial vessels, which France interpreted as a violation of the 1778 treaty, French 
ships began to seize American vessels carrying goods to England.8  French actions 
against American commerce only grew more antagonistic after the signing of Jay’s 
Treaty of 1794, which in the eyes of the French was a complete abrogation of the 
Alliance of 1778.9   
 In December 1793, things grew even more precarious for the republic’s 
commerce as news reached America that Portugal had signed a treaty with Algiers.  
American merchantmen had long benefited from the patrolling ships of the Portuguese 
Navy at the Straits of Gibraltar which kept the Algerine commerce raiders bottled up 
inside the Mediterranean.  But in late 1793, Great Britain convinced Portugal to join them 
in a coalition against France and so drove Portugal into striking a bargain with the Dey of 
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Algiers.10  Within days, several American ships were captured by Algerian raiders 
prompting President George Washington to direct Congress to find some way of 
resolving the Algerine problem.11  Congress responded to Washington’s direction by 
exploring both diplomatic channels and military solutions, and began to debate whether 
“a naval force, adequate to the protection of the commerce of the United Sates against the 
Algerine corsairs, ought to be provided.”12 
 Collectively, these events provided the impetus for a debate from 1794 through 
1796 over the merits of creating a naval force for the purpose of securing the nation’s 
commerce.   Most often this argument rested on the assertion that foreign commerce was 
the lifeblood of the republic, and without it the young nation could not survive.13  Many 
policymakers agreed with the importance of securing the nation’s commerce; however, 
there was no single idea of what a commerce navy should in fact look like.  Variations of 
a commerce navy voiced during the 1790s included the construction of a small number of 
powerful frigates to interdict enemy vessels on behalf of commerce, the arming of 
merchant vessels, the sanctioning of privateers, and the employment of convoys.14  Each 
of these variations represented different tactical applications of the same strategic vision, 
the protection of trade by a republican commerce navy.  Ultimately, in 1794, the variation 
that won out was the creation of a squadron of frigates to interdict on behalf of American 
commerce in the Mediterranean.  The “Act to provide a Naval Armament” passed March 
27, 1794 authorized the construction and employment of four 44-gun frigates and two 36-
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gun frigates.15   This act led to the eventual construction of the 44-gun frigates 
Constitution, President, and United States, the 38-gun Constellation, and the 36-gun 
frigates Congress and Chesapeake.  Progress on these ships was interrupted 1796 when 
President Washington negotiated a peace treaty with Algiers.  As per section 9 of the 
1794 act, construction was to cease upon peace being made with Algiers, but on March 
15, 1796, Washington suggested to Congress that they continue construction.16  Congress 
responded by authorizing the continued construction of two 44-gun frigates and one 36-
gun frigate, but this construction was by no means quick or efficient, and by the time of 
the XYZ Affair in March 1797, none of the ships were yet completed.17 
Frigates 
 Although the Act authorizing the construction of six frigates was the naval 
strategy that Congress enacted in 1794, it was not the only option available to 
policymakers.  Federalist William Loughton Smith of South Carolina acknowledged as 
much in March 1794 by listing the other options that Congress had to consider.  These 
included purchasing a peace with Algiers, convincing Portugal to resume its traditional 
role of piracy suppression, passing commercial regulations against Great Britain, who 
many policymakers believed was behind the Algierine attacks, and finally paying a 
European naval power to protect American ships.18  Smith represented policymakers who 
believed that the answer lay in building a commerce navy consisting of powerful frigates 
that would interdict on behalf of American merchant vessels. Answering assertions that a 
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commerce navy composed of frigates was merely a pretense for establishing a capital 
navy, Smith responded that if the purpose of the act was the “establishment of a navy, 
merely for the idle purposes of vain parade” then he would be opposed to it.  Instead, he 
countered that the vision being offered was that of a naval force to defend the nation’s 
trade, and that ultimately, “the question was, simply whether our commerce required 
protection against the Algerine corsairs, and whether this was the best mode of 
protection.”19  Indignant at proposals that the republic should depend on hiring Portugal’s 
navy to protect its commerce and frustrated with arguments that deploying frigates would 
only serve to involve America in the disputes of Europe, the lawyer from Charleston 
responded that America was “particularly fitted for a navy,” possessing domestically 
natural resources which other nations were forced to find abroad.20  Smith believed that 
the popular voice was behind him, arguing that the people of the United States “wish to 
see a Navy established.”  He concluded that not only would the frigates secure the 
nation’s commerce, but they would also provide “a kind of Naval Academy” for 
instructing youth in the art of naval tactics.21  Smith, who in the next Congress would be 
appointed to the chairmanship of the Committee on Ways and Means, was so confident 
that people would support his naval vision that he was willing to tax both land and slaves 
to raise the necessary funds.  He was also willing to plunge the nation further into debt, 
proposing in 1796 that the President be allowed to borrow money to complete the 
building program with the expectation that new taxes could pay off the debt.22 
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 In the mid 1790s, overseas commerce was overwhelmingly the driving force 
behind the support for building frigates.   Samuel Smith of Maryland was the rare 
Republican who supported a commerce navy consisting of frigates, probably because of 
his background as a Baltimore merchant.23  In February 1794, he joined another 
representative sensitive to maritime issues, Federalist Fisher Ames of Massachusetts, in 
charging that the republic’s commerce was “on the point of being annihilated” from 
seizures and the increase of insurance rates which necessitated the “sending out the 
proposed fleet” of frigates “as quickly as possible.”24   
 Two years later, the debate over the frigates was renewed after President 
Washington’s announcement on March 8, 1796, of the signing of a peace treaty with the 
Dey of Algiers.25  As per the wording of section 9 of the 1794 Act, construction on the 
frigates was to halt if peace was made with Algiers.  Washington suggested to Congress 
that it would be wise to continue the construction of the frigates and many policymakers 
agreed with their President.  Federalist Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts supported 
the vision of a commerce navy in addition to a general expansion of the republic’s 
military forces.  Americans would support building warships while the country was in the 
midst of an economic upturn, and the New England lawyer argued in April 1796 that 
continuing uncertainty in the Mediterranean mandated that frigates be built to guard the 
republic’s overseas economic interests.26  Sedgwick voiced the common belief that 
building frigates would be cheaper in the long run than continuing the practice of 
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annually buying peace with the Barbary States.  Theodore Sedgwick believed that a 
republican sense of honor demanded that its citizens and commerce should be 
protected.27  With the support of policymakers like Sedgwick, the chairman of the House 
Ways and Means Committee was able convince the lame-duck session of Congress to 
approve the April 20, 1796 “Act supplementary to an act” (the March 27, 1794 “Act to 
provide a Naval Armament”).  This act provided the necessary funds to continue the 
construction of the three frigates furthest along in the construction process, the 
Constitution, the United States, and the Constellation.28 
 However, frigates were not the only manifestation of the strategic vision of the 
commerce navy.  During debates from 1794 to 1796 some representatives offered a more 
informal vision of a commerce navy consisting of privateers and armed merchant ships, 
hoping that the young republic could avoid the formal establishment of a naval force. 
Privateers and Armed Merchant Ships 
 During the debates in early 1796 over whether to continue the frigate building 
program of 1794, many policymakers voiced alternate conceptions of a commerce navy. 
Federalist John Williams of New York was one such representative.  He believed that the 
identity of the new republic was separate from the European Powers and therefore should 
not be patterned after their tired model of large armies, navies, and never-ending 
conflicts.29  Williams was another individual who defies the stereotype of Federalists as 
navalists trying to force through their vision of a capital navy.  Despite having been born 
in England and having served as a surgeon on a British man-of-war, Williams did not 
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want the American republic and its navy to follow the example of his birthplace.30  
“Letters of marque…were the best fighting ships,” argued Williams; a solution which he 
maintained was cheaper and when compared to frigates, less apt to provoke the wrath of 
the European powers.31  His vision of the republican identity centered on agriculture, 
which Williams argued was “the true interests of this country” and would inevitably 
suffer from increased taxation in support of a more conventional navy established to 
protect American merchant interests.32  For a “Spartan” like Williams, an undue emphasis 
on foreign commerce was bound to undermine the republican order, and the obvious 
benefit of privateers was the absence of a formal naval establishment:  “no officers, no 
sailors, no materials to provide.”33 
 A slight variation on William’s privateer argument was the concept of arming 
merchant ships; an idea offered by William Loughton Smith after he came to the 
realization that the 1794 Act might not be extended.34  Using merchant vessels was a 
tactic which Smith argued had served Great Britain well in her East Indian trade and 
could be adapted for the purpose of defending American commerce.35  The concept 
behind this idea was that Congress could encourage merchants through financial 
incentives to build a style of trading vessel which could be easily converted into a ship of 
war should necessity arise.  By quickly adding guns to their ships the republic would 
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have an effective navy without incurring the cost necessary to establish a formal navy.36  
If only one fifth of the nation’s trade vessels were so modified, then in a few years “they 
might have 1000 vessels of this description.”37  Despite the benefits of such a plan, it was 
a tough argument for the southern planter to make to his fellow congressmen because it 
opened up a heated debate over the neutrality of armed merchants and the danger posed 
by hot-headed merchantmen involving the country in a war by instigating an incident, 
rather than merely protecting themselves.38  But Smith’s alternate vision of a republican 
commerce navy found a ready ally in Federalist John Williams of New York, because it 
posed little threat to his concept of the republic’s agrarian society as representing its true 
character; a character Williams feared would be corrupted and threatened by a 
conventional naval establishment.39  Williams was yet another Federalist who could 
hardly be labeled a navalist.  
Convoys 
 1797 was a year of transition between two naval strategic visions.  New President 
John Adams brought a different strategic vision for a republican navy with him to 
Washington in 1797 (see chapter 3); however, it would not be until after the XYZ Affair 
in 1798 that he had the political capital necessary to enact legislation supporting his naval 
plan of action.  In the meantime, Adams’ May 16, 1797 address to the special session of 
the newly elected 5th Congress sparked several debates in the House of Representatives.  
One debate was over the tactic Adams had mentioned in his speech regarding the use of 
convoys to protect American merchant ships.  Adams called the session in response to the 
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French Executive Directory’s expulsion of America’s minister to France, Charles 
Cotesworth Pinckney, and its declaration of “limited maritime hostilities” against 
American commerce in March.40  In the intervening month between Adams’ call for the 
session and Congress’ assembly in May, Adams sought advice from his Cabinet on how 
best to respond to the growing French crisis.  Secretary of the Treasury Oliver Wolcott, 
Jr., Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, and Secretary of War, James McHenry all 
forwarded Adams’ questions to Alexander Hamilton and his thoughts formed the basis 
the ensuing reports they each submitted to Adams.  These reports formed most of Adams’ 
May 16 speech, so for this reason it is hard to discern Adams’ ideas from those of 
Hamilton.41  This could be one reason why Adams’ recommendation to Congress that “it 
appears to me necessary to equip the frigates, and provide other vessels of inferior force, 
to take under convoy such merchant vessels as shall remain unarmed” seems at odds with 
his strategic vision of a regional navy outlined in chapter 3.42   
 Creating a commerce navy of frigate-convoys was a significant departure from 
some of the preceding visions of a commerce navy because it would necessitate a formal 
“naval establishment” that contrasted with the informal and relatively inexpensive 
commerce navy of privateers or armed merchant ships.  Accordingly, advocates of a fleet 
of convoy ships attracted sharp criticism from opponents of a naval establishment, but 
policymakers supporting the convoying of merchant ships were equally passionate about 
protecting what they perceived as America’s vital interest.  Building and employing 
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American warships for the purpose of convoying merchant vessels was supported 
fervently by Federalists John Allen of Connecticut and Harrison Gray Otis of 
Massachusetts.43  These attorneys argued that it was a simple decision to defend “the 
whole mass of the citizens distributed into different professions” which collectively 
constituted the identity of the republic.  Their vision of the republic protected the sanctity 
of a citizen’s property, whether it was a piece of land or a trade good.  Specifically, Otis 
was convinced that “the ship of a merchant is not less the property of the country than the 
house of a farmer” and it would be disastrous for the unity of the republic to tell its 
merchants, “Your country cannot protect you.”44  Allen shuddered to think that his 
republic would embrace the identity of a weak nation, unwilling to stand up to other 
countries’ “insults” and “robberies.”45   
 Otis and Allen were fierce defenders of private property, and not merely the 
version characterized by soil and water, but consumer goods as well.  Neither land nor 
trade goods were more important than the other; they were equal components of the 
sacred entity, property.  Additionally, “agriculture and commerce are twin sisters,” Otis 
argued, “and cannot live separate from each other” because if they were forced to do so 
they would “expire at the same moment.”46  Not only did America have a right to convoy 
its commerce, but the very nature of a republic that ensured the sanctity of private 
property demanded that it defend its commercial trade.  Otis and Allen were 
representative of New England Federalists who readily supported convoys of the 
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republic’s commerce, but it was not just Federalists or New Englanders who supported 
this strategic vision.  Republican Samuel Smith of Maryland reminded policymakers that 
there was no reason why the frigates he had argued for several years before could not be 
put to use in convoy duty.47 
 One of the most cogent arguments in favor of establishing a commerce navy for 
the purposes of convoying American commerce was offered by the hawkish Federalist 
Robert Goodloe Harper of South Carolina. Arguing that “except there was a spirit to 
defend property, there could be no security in the possession of it,” the southern lawyer 
maintained that a “few millions of dollars” was a small price to pay to secure the 
republic’s commerce.48  Fervently believing that without a naval establishment 
“commerce could not exist,” Harper rejected the argument of policymakers who thought 
the new republic should be isolationist, in the order of China and the East Indies.  Harper 
worried that a commerce navy of privateers would ultimately prove more expensive for 
the public because the cost incurred by merchants would be passed on to consumers 
through higher costs for their imported goods.49  Following the Directory’s actions in 
March 1797, marine insurance had risen 10 cents practically overnight.50  Answering the 
charges of policymakers intent on defending the interests of agriculture, Harper asserted 
that agriculture would “fall into speedy decay” if commerce were destroyed, and he 
trusted that common Americans “would discern the conne[ct]ion between commerce and 
agriculture.”51  Policymakers would be completely justified in taxing agriculture to pay 
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for a commerce navy because the agricultural interest would “easily perceive that money 
paid for the defen[s]e of commerce, was, in effect, paid for the defen[s]e of 
agriculture.”52  Commerce was the “market” for the republic’s agricultural production, 
and provided an important cog in the emerging consumer culture of America.  As Harper 
reminded his peers, proceeds from the trade of agriculture allowed them to buy “the 
comforts and necessaries which our own country does not produce.”53 
 Otis, Allen, Harper and others who argued that a commerce navy was necessary 
in order to protect the republic’s trade faced a tough fight against advocates of 
republicanism who viewed the British mercantile system as the embodiment of 
corruption. These policymakers feared that an overemphasis on commerce was leading 
their fledgling republic steadily down a similar path to ruin.54  The debate over a 
commerce navy was part of a much larger phenomenon overtaking America as well as 
Europe:  the emergence of the market economy and the initial transformation from an 
agricultural society to an industrial society.55  Otis defended the virtue of the new market, 
arguing that not only did commerce raise the value of the nation’s lands, but the market 
helped satisfy the fluctuations of demand.56  According to Otis’ logic it was wrong to 
penalize the “enterprise of the exporter” who discovered that demand for the nation’s 
agricultural produce was high due to famine or war, because “when trade is free” the only 
limit to America’s profit would be the limit of her production.  However, restricting trade 
would only discourage the enterprising merchant and certainly result in a lower demand 
                                                 
52 Annals of Congress, 5th Congress, 2nd sess., 1452. 
53 Ibid., 1454. 
54 McCoy, The Elusive Republic, 57-62. 
55 Martin Brugel, Farm, Shop, Landing:  The Rise of a Market Society in the Hudson Valley, 1780-1860 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 4-5; McCoy, The Elusive Republic, 17-18. 




for the republic’s agricultural goods.57 
 On the other hand, defenders of a more Spartan brand of republican virtue, like 
New Yorker John Williams, felt threatened by the growing emphasis on trade and feared 
his constituents would share an undo part of the financial burden of a commerce navy.58  
Even though Williams was a large landholding Federalist who acknowledged that “the 
commercial and agricultural interests were intimately connected,” he argued that if 
property holders were liable “for three or four millions of dollars a year to protect 
commerce” then it would be better for the republic to have “no commerce at all.”59  For 
Williams, the establishment of a commerce navy was symptomatic of “a mistaken zeal 
which drove men to pursue commerce instead of agriculture, and suppose that it was that 
which served the best interests of the country.”60  American commerce had been 
“extended too far” and had produced an unhealthy consumerism which turned the happy 
sufficient citizens of the early 1780s into troubled debtors.  Worse yet, Williams argued, 
the post-Revolutionary influx of foreign commodities had “annihilated” domestic 
manufacturing.61  What was Williams’ vision of a navy fit for the new republic?  He 
concluded that “the landed interest would cheerfully come forward to defend the country 
against invasion, but not for extensive convoys to protect our trade.”62   
 Finally, it should be mentioned that some Federalists, like Alexander Hamilton 
and Rufus King, advocated an alliance with Great Britain and recommended accepting 
Great Britain’s offers in 1797 and 1798 to allow American merchant vessels to sail in 
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convoy with the Royal Navy.  This was not a concept widespread enough among 
policymakers to merit discussion here, but the nature of the idea will be discussed more 
in depth in chapter 3. 
Commerce Navy, 1801-1805 
 Although in 1797 the strategic vision of the commerce navy was in the process of 
being superseded by Adams’ vision of a regional navy, the concept of a commerce navy 
would continue to drive the arguments of many policymakers.  America benefited from 
its role as middleman between the warring nations of Europe and U. S. trade continued to 
grow despite the British Admiralty court Polly decision (1800) which forced American 
merchants to engage in a process called “re-exportation.”  In a routine that soon proved to 
be a mere charade, American merchants were permitted to carry cargo of Great Britain’s 
enemies as long as they first imported their goods to a neutral country.63   The value of 
American exports more than tripled after the French National Convention officially 
declared war on most of Europe in 1793, and by 1800 the value of American re-exports 
had increased from around 1 million to nearly 50 million dollars in response to increased 
European demand.64  The emergence of the market economy, the growing 
interdependence of commerce and agriculture, and flourishing consumerism provided an 
important rationale for a republic to establish a naval force dedicated to securing 
commerce, be it with frigates, privateers, armed merchant ships, or convoys.  In 1801, in 
response to new hostilities in the Mediterranean, the new Republican President, Thomas 
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Jefferson, was forced to revisit the commerce navy vision. 
 Traditionally, naval historiography has considered the Republican Jefferson as the 
architect of the gunboat navy that dominated the naval planning from 1807-1812.65  In 
reality, however, his naval vision was much more complex than this erroneous stereotype 
and will be covered more in depth in chapter 5.  Although Jefferson’s preferred strategic 
vision was a coastal navy, from 1801 to 1805 he reinstituted the commerce navy vision of 
1794-1796.  Late in life, Jefferson wrote to John Adams that he wished “we could have a 
convention with the naval powers of Europe, for them to keep down the pirates of the 
Mediterranean” indicating his desire to keep the nation’s naval force close to home.66  
Jefferson was pushed into this position by the Bashaw of Tripoli, Yusuf Karamanli, who 
on February 26, 1801, declared war on American shipping.  Upset that Tripoli was not 
receiving annual tribute like his neighbors Algiers and Tunis, Karamanli demanded a one 
time payment of $225,000 and annual payments of $25,000 from the United States.67  
After consulting with his cabinet on May 15, 1801, Jefferson ordered the U.S. frigates 
still in service to the Mediterranean to protect American commerce, although he 
recognized that he was in a grey area constitutionally.  Only Congress could declare war, 
and although it did not formally do so, Congress passed the “Act for the protection of the 
Commerce and Seamen of the United States, against the Tripolitan Cruisers” on February 
6, 1802.  This Act authorized Jefferson to employ all seaworthy vessels in the U. S. Navy 
and also permitted the commissioning of private vessels to act as privateers authorized to 
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seize any Tripolitan vessels.68  Unlike in 1794, when the commerce navy vision attracted 
much criticism with in Congress, in December 1801 when the February 6, 1802 Act was 
first debated in the House, even traditionally anti-navy representatives like William Giles 
had softened their resistance.  Giles was now resigned to the fact that the republic did 
possess a navy, and although he was not willing to supplement it, he was willing to 
deploy it to the Mediterranean since the situation in late 1801 qualified as an 
“emergency.”69  
 While the importance of securing commerce would remain a significant goal of 
congressional naval strategists throughout the late 1790s, the new executive who assumed 
office in 1796 held a different naval strategic vision.  Protecting commerce would remain 
an important priority of the strategic vision of President John Adams, but it was only one 
piece of his plan.  Thanks to the XYZ Affair in 1798, Adams was given a chance to 
implement his idea of what he thought a republican navy should be: a regional navy.
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Chapter 3:  Regional Navy, 1797-1800 
While the heightened tensions of the Quasi-War allowed some Federalists to 
advance their strategic vision of a capital navy in the new republic (chapter 4), the 
strategic vision actually employed during the limited war with France from 1798-1800 
was that of a regional navy.  Practically, this naval philosophy maintained that the young 
republic’s navy must patrol and exert influence in a geographic region that included the 
coastal United States and Caribbean.  With regard to the Quasi-War, this meant the 
deployment of U.S. sloops and frigates along the American coast and to the Caribbean to 
secure American commerce and strike back at French privateers and warships seizing 
U.S. merchant vessels throughout the region.  Accordingly, this vision incorporated 
elements of both the commerce and coastal navy strategic visions by making the security 
of the American coastline and American commerce both priorities.   
Since few American policymakers before, during, and after the Quasi-War 
advocated a regional navy, the question worth asking is how the regional navy policy 
came to dominate the naval operations from 1798-1800.   Despite enjoying few 
supporters in Congress, the regional navy was endorsed by a most important naval 
strategist, President John Adams.  Washington’s successor was the most identifiable 
proponent of establishing the republic’s navy as a regional force, a vision that was a 
byproduct of his foreign policy ideologies.  Chief among these was the concept of a 
“balance of powers,” that can be traced back to the writings of Gabreel Bonnet de Mably 
and Emmerich de Vattel.1 
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Those who describe Adam’s naval vision often begin with his well-known 
“wooden wall” quote, which was actually part of a written reply to an address of the 
Boston Marine Society in September 1798.  Public support for Adams soared following 
the publication of the XYZ Affair as American citizens responded with indignation to the 
diplomacy of the French Directory.  This public outcry was exactly what Adams needed 
to convince Congress to enact the new taxation necessary to support his naval vision.2  
Americans of all kinds and throughout all parts of the nation sent the President many 
letters, or addresses, expressing encouragement and support.3  The address from the 
Boston Marine Society was just one of these, and in reply, Adams reminded the 
Massachusetts society that 
Floating batteries and wooden walls have been my favorite system of warfare and 
defen[s]e for this country for three and twenty years.  I have had very little 
success in making proselytes.  At the present moment, however, Americans in 
general, cultivators as well as merchants and mariners, begin to look to that 
source of security and protection…4 
 
While this quote seems to support the common assumption that Adams was a classic 
coastal navy theorist (see chapter 5), the entire body of his naval thought needs to be 
examined in order to understand his true strategic vision for the republic’s naval force.  
As Adams wrote to Benjamin Rush in 1811, “floating batteries and wooden walls” did 
not translate into a Republican coastal navy of gunboats, rather he “always believed that 
[Jefferson’s] system of gunboats for a national defen[s]e was defective.”5  Adams had 
long advocated establishing a naval force, believing that without one “our Union will be 
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but a brittle China vase, a house of ice, or a palace of glass.”6   
However, unlike many Federalists, Adams was not a proponent of the capital 
navy vision advanced by many in his party during the Quasi-War, and in 1808 he 
expressed regret over his decision to allow his Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin Stoddert,  
push the nation towards a capital navy by recommending to Congress the construction of 
six ships-of-the-line in February 1799.7  In an 1808 letter to the Speaker of the House, 
Massachusetts Republican J. B. Varnum, Adams maintained that “I never was fond of the 
plan of building line of battle ships.”8  Rather, Adams reiterated his desire was “to have 
fast-sailing frigates to scour the seas and make impression on the enemy’s commerce; 
and in this way we can do great things.”9  He was certainly opposed to the navalist 
philosophy of fleet engagements, countering that “our policy is not to fight squadrons at 
sea.”10 
 Adams’ address to the special session of Congress in May 1797 after the French 
Directory’s rejection of Pinckney and announcement of new restrictions upon American 
commerce provides a window into Adam’s strategic vision 
But besides a protection of our commerce on the seas, I think it highly necessary 
to protect it at home, where it is collected in our most important ports. The 
distance of the United States from Europe and the well-known promptitude, ardor, 
and courage of the people in defense of their country happily diminish the 
probability of invasion.11 
 
Securing the American coastline and commerce were clearly both priorities of Adams 
which distinguishes his vision from those offering coastal or commerce naval visions 
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which focused exclusively on protecting either commerce or the American coast, but not 
both.   In concluding his message, Adams stated how the United States fit into the 
balance of powers 
However we may consider ourselves, the maritime and commercial powers of the 
world will consider the United States of America as forming a weight in that 
balance of power in Europe which never can be forgotten or neglected.  It would 
not only be against our interest, but it would be doing wrong to one-half of 
Europe, at least, if we should voluntarily throw ourselves into either scale.12 
 
   So, what exactly was Adams’ idea of naval balance of powers?  Adams knew 
from experience during the American Revolution that the U.S. could not defeat a great 
navy such as Britain’s on the seas, but still needed to prevent a European navy from 
seizing command of the American coastline.  During the Revolution, this meant forming 
an alliance with a European power that could do a job the Continental Navy could not.  In 
1779, Adams, along with Benjamin Franklin and Arthur Lee, petitioned the French to 
send a fleet to seize “naval superiority” along the American coast and in the West Indies 
from the British.13   Again, in 1780, Adams wrote to William Carmichael, the American 
secretary of legation in Spain, in an effort to secure more ships and fewer troops from 
both France and Spain in an effort to break the Royal Navy’s “domination of the 
American seas.”14  After the Revolution, Adams remained steadfast as ever in his desire 
to prevent another nation from seizing control of America’s waters.    His desire was to 
keep a navy such as Britain’s off balance by exploiting geographic advantages and 
making full use of diplomacy, while fielding a naval force consisting of frigates, brigs, 
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and sloops in order to allow American trade to continue under the banner of neutrality.15   
 By and large, historians have overlooked Adams’ concept of a naval balance of 
power and his concept of regional influence.16  Frederic Hayes was the first historian to 
call attention to Adams’ notion of balance of sea power, and he argued that after Adams 
studied the Royal Navy’s command of the sea, he came to the conclusion that America 
must exert control over an area Hayes termed the “North-American-West Indian 
triangle.”17  As far back as 1779, Adams believed that it was essential that America 
control this region.  Writing the Marquis de Lafayette in 1779, Adams argued that the 
West Indian Islands were vital to America’s independence, calling them links in a 
mutually supporting chain, of which if “one or two were taken away, the whole, or at 
least the greater part, must fall.”  Adams continued that it was “indispensably necessary 
to keep a clear naval superiority, both on the coast of the continent and in the West India 
Islands.”18  Later that fall, Adams made the same argument to Congress, asserting “that I 
have ever thought it a main principle of their policy to maintain a constant and decided 
superiority of naval power in the West India Islands and upon the coast of this 
continent.”19  And lest the French forget what sort of naval support America required, 
Adams wrote French foreign minister Charles Gravier, compte de Vergennes, that “the 
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policy and necessity of keeping always a superior fleet both in the West India Islands and 
on the coast of the continent of North America” was of utmost importance.20 
 Adams believed it was “essential that the sovereign of every commercial State 
could make his nation’s flag respected in all the seas and by all the nations of the world” 
and thereby “produce a balance of power on the seas.”21   If all the maritime nations 
asserted themselves in their geographic spheres of influence, the lesser maritime nations 
of the world could exert a naval balance to counter the more dominant nation.22  One of 
Marshall Smelser’s students, historian William Anderson argues that Adams’ concept of 
the North-American-West Indian triangle is what led him to oppose war with the Dey of 
Algiers in the early 1790s, preferring instead to pay the demanded tribute.  Many 
historians have noted the irony of Jefferson’s support for the war against Algiers, whereas 
Adams, the longtime naval advocate, argued against the use of military force in the 
Mediterranean.  However, Adams’ strategic vision of the regional navy was focused on 
America’s regional influence and did not include sending a navy across the Atlantic to 
the Mediterranean.  In this light, Adams’ desire to avoid military action so far from North 
America makes more sense and it provides an answer to a policy position by Adams that 
has long troubled historians.23 
So, how did Adams’ naval strategy of the regional navy manifest itself practically 
during the Quasi-War?  On May 16, 1797, Adams asked Congress to equip the three 
frigates still under construction under the Naval Act of 1794 (the USS United States, USS 
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Constitution, and USS Constellation), to build an unspecified additional number of sloops 
of war, permit the arming of merchantmen, and authorize the convoying of American 
commerce.24  Congress, however, was not willing to give the President a blank check to 
create his vision of a republican naval force.  The “Act Providing a Naval Armament” 
passed by Congress on July 1, 1797, only authorized equipping the three frigates.25  
Ultimately, these three frigates would launch later that year and achieve respectable 
victories against French ships in the West Indies during the naval action of the Quasi-
War.   
After the publication of the XYZ Affair on April 3, 1798, Congress was willing to 
sign off on more of Adams’ naval vision.26  On April 27, 1798, an act authorized the 
President to build or purchase up to twelve 22-gun vessels, while three days later 
Congress established the Department of the Navy.27  On May 3 and 4, acts were passed to 
provide for coastal defense through the construction of coastal and harbor fortification 
along with authorizing the procurement of up to ten galleys.28  Congress had stopped 
short of declaring war on France, but in three separate acts during the summer of 1798 
they escalated the conflict by authorizing limited maritime hostilities.  First, on May 28, 
Congress authorized American commanders to capture any foreign armed vessel “found 
hovering on the coasts of the United States, for the purpose of committing depredations” 
upon American commerce.29  Then on June 25, they declared that American merchant 
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vessels would be allowed to defend themselves from search and seizure by French 
ships.30  The escalation continued just two days after Congress declared all treaties with 
France void, as they expanded their act of May 28 to allow American commanders to 
seize French vessels operating anywhere on the high seas while also authorizing the 
President to grant privateering commissions.31  Finally, on July 16, Congress 
appropriated money to complete the final three 1794 frigates, the USS President, USS 
Congress, and USS Chesapeake.32 
During the Quasi-War, the implementation of Adam’s regional navy reflected his 
strategic vision, but elements of it also supported the vision of the anglophile faction of 
Federalists including Alexander Hamilton, Timothy Pickering, Rufus King, and of 
course, Benjamin Stoddert.    This influence is primarily reflected by the authorization to 
build six 74-gun ships-of-the-line in 1799 (see chapter 4) and limited cooperation with 
the Royal Navy on West Indies intelligence and maritime convoys.  These policies are 
not evidence of inconsistency in Adams’ vision of a regional navy, but strategies 
indicative of the “high” Federalist influence within his administration. 
Adams was very reluctant to make a naval alliance with Great Britain part of his 
naval strategy.  Such an alliance was desired by many Federalists, including William 
Loughton Smith, but Adams never fully shook his Revolutionary suspicion of Britain.33  
Additionally, an Anglo-American alliance ran counter to the very essence of Adams’ 
belief that Britain’s global maritime dominance needed balancing.  Steps towards 
cooperation with Great Britain were undertaken by Secretary of the Navy Benjamin 
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Stoddert, Secretary of State Pickering, and Rufus King, the American ambassador to 
Great Britain, but there is no evidence that Adams condoned any of their actions.  
Additionally, Stoddert allowed his officers to share intelligence with British captains in 
the West Indies, an informal cooperation that was aided by a set of maritime recognition 
signals devised by the commander of the Royal Navy’s North American station, Vice 
Admiral George Vandeput, and Stoddert himself.34   
While Stoddert quietly facilitated limited cooperation with the British, Pickering 
and King, both well-known anglophiles and Hamiltonians, advocated accepting the Royal 
Navy’s offer to convoy American merchantmen.35  In spring of 1797 and winter of 1798, 
King was approached by American merchants desiring to join British convoys, and King 
had sensed that the British government would be more than happy to oblige.36  King 
sought authorization from Pickering, who replied that “if…that power voluntarily offers, 
or on the request of individuals, grants the requisite Convoys, are we to refuse them?  
Certainly not, and such is the sense of the President.”37  On this guidance, King allowed 
the spring merchant ships to sail from Britain under Royal Navy convoy.38  However, it 
seems that Pickering was assuming too much, because a year later he replied to King in 
the negative, that although “threatening as is the aspect of our affairs with France, the 
President does not deem it expedient at this time to make any advances to Great Britain.”  
Pickering concluded in words that had to have come from Adams, “All this is very 
convenient in our present defenseless condition, but how disgraceful to the United States 
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if we continue to depend on the protection of the British Navy…”39   
Finally, it is worth considering how Adams’ thoughts and philosophy of trade and 
commerce fits into his naval strategy.  Early on, Adams consistently voiced a philosophy 
of free trade, but his failure to condemn the Jay Treaty in 1794 complicates the picture of 
Adams’ economic ideals.  His contributions to the “model treaty” or Treaty Plan of 1776 
rested on the principle of free trade.  One example of this was his disdain for the British 
practice of considering certain goods carried by neutral flagged ships as “contraband” 
that could aid their enemy, and thus subject to seizure.  Adams told Congress on April 14, 
1780, that he thought “that the abolition of the whole doctrine of contraband would be for 
the peace and happiness of mankind; and I doubt not, as human reason advances…all 
neutral nations will allow, by universal consent, to carry what goods they please in their 
own ships…”40  Adams was in effect advocating “free ships, free goods,” the classic 
liberal ideal of trade spreading throughout Europe and North America thanks to the 
writings of David Hume and Adam Smith.41   
However, some historians like William Appleman Williams and Gerard Clarfield 
argue that Adams was not the simple economic liberal that the historiography has made 
him out to be.42  They maintain that the economic liberalism attributed to Adams clashed 
with a naval strategy that advocated a regional sea power for not only the security of 
America’s territorial possessions, but also to ensure the security of its trade.  Clarfield 
labels this a balancing of America’s international trade to assure that no one European 
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nation had a monopoly on America’s commerce.  Additionally, Clarfield believes that 
Adams abandoned his idealism of free trade in the 1790s when he was faced with the 
realist implications of neutrality amidst the Revolutionary Wars of France and Britain.43  
This is an important point, because while the Adams of 1780 was willing to condemn 
contraband lists, the Adams of 1794 was not.  His failure to condemn the Jay Treaty for 
its general restrictiveness towards American trade, including the continuation of the 
British contraband lists, complicates our understanding of Adams’ true beliefs.  The 
whole British mercantile system was founded upon the enforcing arm of the Royal Navy 
and Adams’ many statements linking American trade and sea power are interpreted by 
historians like William Appleman Williams as evidence that Adams was a “key figure in 
the evolution of an American mercantilism.”44 
Neither of these historians’ attempts to force Adams into some kind of 
neomercantilist box is completely convincing, however.  Clarfield undermines his 
argument by illustrating Adams’ concerted attempts to maintain balance in American 
commerce, efforts that hardly seem at odds with a philosophy of free trade.  As Adams 
wrote to John Jay in April 1785 
My system is a very simple one; let us preserve the friendship of France, Holland, 
and Spain, if we can, and in case of a war between France and England, let us 
preserve our neutrality, if possible…To avoid a war with England, we should take 
the regular diplomatic steps to negotiate, to settle disputes as they rise, and to 
place the intercourse between the two nations upon a certain footing…45    
 
Historian Jerald A. Combs provides an insightful counter to the mercantilist arguments of 
Williams and Clarfield by stressing the context of the late 1780s and 1790s.  Stressing 
that Adams, Madison, and Jefferson all preferred the principle of free trade, Combs 
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argues that the reality of European politics led them to believe that for the time being, 
such a policy would be unrealistic.  Specifically, Adams seemed to believe that the Jay 
Treaty was as good as the United States could expect in 1794 without going to war with 
Great Britain.  More important to these Founders was keeping the new United States out 
of another war with a European power, and so peaceful weapons, such as trade and 
commercial retaliation, were highly preferable to strictly military solutions.46  
Williams’ attempt to connect the naval strategy of Adams with a developing form 
of American mercantilism fails to fully explain of the reality of Adams’ naval strategy.  If 
Adams were advocating a capital navy like many of his fellow Federalists, Williams’ 
argument might be more persuasive.  However, the very fact that Adams rejected the 
concept of the capital navy supports the argument that he was also rejecting the 
mercantilism that went hand in hand with a capital navy such as Britain’s in the 
eighteenth century.  Instead, Adams’ desire to field a regional navy with a “softer” foot-
print than that of a capital navy was entirely complimentary to the concept of free trade.  
In reality, Adams’ naval strategy demonstrated that his advocacy of free trade was not 
simply an opportunistic grab at what was best for the economic interests of the early 
American republic.  The neomercantilist label is perhaps better suited for some advocates 
of the capital navy strategic vision. While never quite dominant as a naval strategic 
vision, by 1799 the capital navy vision was beginning to eclipse Adams’ regional navy 
strategy and was the closest it would come to becoming official naval policy during the 
early republic.
                                                 




Chapter 4:  Capital Navy, 1799-1800 
The date was January 1798 and the House of Representatives was in the midst of 
a debate over whether to obligate money to complete the frigates first authorized by 
Congress in 1794.  Federalist Samuel Sewall was determined to voice not only his 
support for the measure but his strategic vision for a republican navy, concluding his 
speech with the declaration that  “…he considered a Naval Aramament [sic] as necessary 
to the dignity and national character of the United States.”1  The strategic purpose for a 
navy that would defend the honor and reputation of a nation advocated by the lawyer 
from Massachusetts was characteristic of the navalist concept of a navy’s ultimate 
purpose.  This strategic vision of a navy assumed the republic’s maritime force would 
serve the functions of coastal and commerce navies, but when a policymaker invoked 
words such as “dignity and national character” his peers would instantly equate such 
words with the desire to establish a European-style capital navy.2 
During the first thirty years of the new nation, the best opportunity for the 
advocates of a capital navy to implement their strategic vision of the republic’s naval 
force came during the “apex” of Federalist control in 1798 and 1799.  During the Quasi-
War, episodes like the XYZ Affair, outrages like the seizures of American merchant 
vessels along the republic’s coastline, and the fears in the South of a Haitian invasion 
supplied navalists with the political capital necessary to push for their strategic vision of a 
republican military.  A formal cabinet position was created for a “Commissioner of the 
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Marine” soon after the XYZ Affair was made public on April 30, 1798.3  Chief among 
the plans of this new department was the push by the first Secretary of the Navy, 
Benjamin Stoddert, to build twelve 74-gun ships-of-line, a class of ships synonymous 
with late eighteenth century capital navies.4  Historian Michael Palmer has argued 
persuasively that it was Stoddert who persuaded a reluctant Adams to sign off on a 
capital navy building project, and Adams’ own writings support this analysis.  Looking 
back on the Quasi War years, Adams wrote in 1808 that he “was never fond of the plan 
of building line of battle ships,” which did not fit well with the president’s strategic 
vision of a regional navy.5  Adams’ willingness to compromise on his naval vision was 
indicative of the constant conflict between himself and a cabinet under the influence of 
Alexander Hamilton and the Hamiltonian vision of America.   
As one of the young republic’s foremost advocates of a capital navy, Stoddert 
oversaw federal naval expenditures that by 1800 reached $3,448,716.03, representing 
29% of the total expenses of the United States Government.6  He repeatedly pushed for 
the construction of ships-of-the-line and the establishment of a navy possessing all the 
trappings of a large European navy, such as flag officers.7  While acknowledging that it 
would expose him to “ridicule” to designate admirals for a Navy that in 1800 only 
possessed eleven frigates, Stoddert was convinced that “by a Navy alone we can secure 
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respect to our rights as a Sovereign Nation,” and recommended the designation of two 
full admirals, two vice admirals, and two rear admirals.8  In 1801, with his Federalist 
party kicked out of power by the Republican Revolution, he continued to cling to his 
capital navy vision for America.  Stoddert still maintained that twelve ships-of-the-line 
and “double the number strong frigates” would be the minimum necessary to allow the 
nation “to avoid those wars in which we have no interest.”9  Stoddert’s argument 
highlights one of the key arguments of the supporters of the capital navy, that a strong 
maritime force in peacetime would ensure both the security of commerce and the nation’s 
coastline.  In so doing, Michael Palmer argues the first Secretary of the Navy was a late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century American policymaker that advanced ideas 
similar to that of the late nineteenth century naval strategy of Alfred Thayer Mahan.10  
The question of whether Mahan’s ideas were present among the naval visions of the 
navalists of the early republic is a question that deserves further investigation. 
Although Sewall and other navalists had more popular support for their strategic 
vision of a capital navy during the Quasi War years of 1798-1800, it was not the first time 
such a vision had been proposed.  Federalist Fisher Ames had argued for the formation of 
a capital navy as early as 1796.  Like Sewall, Ames was a lawyer from Massachusetts, 
and possessed the same desire as Sewall to build a navy that would “induce some 
respect” and “would have some effect on the imagination of foreign Powers.”11  The navy 
Ames envisioned would also protect commerce and provide a coastal defense, but what 
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distinguished the vision embraced by he and other proponents of a capital navy was the 
role of a navy in securing respect abroad for the new republic.  For these navalists, 
“respect” in its most practical sense meant building a navy possessing enough retaliatory 
power to prevent the seizures of American merchant vessels by the British and French 
navies and put a halt to the Royal Navy’s practice of impressment.  On a more 
philosophical level, “respect” equated to securing America’s place in the international 
political culture.  In an age where the traditional European powers expected the American 
republican experiment to fail, the formation of a strong naval force would demonstrate 
that even though a republic was something new in the international arena, the new United 
States was a legitimate nation state.12   
The theme of “respect abroad” was a common thread of unity in the discourse of 
those who supported a capital navy, and a typical manifestation of such a vision was 
Federalist Josiah Parker’s advocacy of constructing of ships-of-the-line.  Parker was a 
former naval officer who endorsed his fellow Virginian Thomas Jefferson’s support of a 
naval force consisting of eighteen ships-of-the-line, published in Jefferson’s Notes on 
Virginia.13  Parker was taking Jefferson’s comments out of context (see chapter 5), but 
like Jefferson, who maintained that it was “foolish” to aspire to “a navy as the greater 
nations of Europe possess,” Parker did not believe the United States needed a navy equal 
the greatest capital navies of Europe.  Parker’s example demonstrates that the capital 
navy vision did not necessarily mean that policymakers longed to build a navy that would 
be the equal of Great Britain.  Rather, his desire was to build “a respectable naval force to 
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protect us at home, our commerce abroad, and leave us in a situation to be more respected 
by foreign nations than we have heretofore been.”14  Over one hundred years later Mahan 
advanced a similar argument in Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812, writing 
that during both the War of 1812 and Mahan’s own era it was not possible or in the best 
interests of the United States to pursue a naval force equal to that of Great Britain.  
Instead, like Parker, Mahan advocated a naval force sufficient to prevent a maritime 
power like Britain from being able to blockade and otherwise control the American 
coastline.15 
Alexander Hamilton, champion of a strong federal union and proponent of an 
internationally active nation-state, played an important role in fostering the capital navy 
vision.16  Although Hamilton did not have a direct hand in the formulation of policy in 
the late 1790s, it has been well-documented that several members of Adams’ cabinet 
sought his advice on many matters, including naval issues.  In 1798, writing to Secretary 
Pickering, Hamilton advocated arming merchants, finishing the 1794 frigates, 
constructing a number of sloops-of-war, and “to provide and equip ten ships of the 
line.”17  Then, in 1799, writing to Secretary of War James McHenry, he advocated again 
the construction of six ships-of-the-line and twenty frigates, for a total of 26 warships.  
Lest anyone conclude that Hamilton’s militaristic adventures led him to ignore the navy, 
as of 1800 the prominent Federalist was still advocating the completion over nearly thirty 
warships, six of which would be ships-of-the-line.18  Hamilton was more occupied with 
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building himself a strong army, but it is evident that the navalism of a capital navy fit 
well into his vision of the United States as a powerful nation state that could compete 
with the great nations of Europe economically, politically, and militarily.19  According to 
this vision, only after establishing a formidable army and navy, creating a strong system 
of raising revenues, reinforcing the nation’s manufacturing capabilities, and enhancing 
the unity and power of the government, would the United States assume its rightful place 
as the leader of the western hemisphere.20  
Secretary McHenry did not need much convincing, although many accused him of 
being a tool that Hamilton used to advance his agenda under the nose of a president he 
opposed.21  In fact, this and the charge of inefficient management of the Department of 
War lent strength to the drive in 1798 to create a separate naval establishment.22  While 
Stoddert’s role in creating a capital navy is undeniable, it is worth noting that weeks 
before the creation of Stoddert’s office, McHenry recommended to Congress on April 9, 
1798 that the expansion of the navy should include six ships-of-the-line.23  The purposes 
of this expanded U. S. Navy included every task conceivable for a navy:  convoy duty, 
coastal protection, overseas interdiction, and the prevention of “humiliation” at the hands 
of the French Navy.24  McHenry’s collection of tasks for the republic’s navy illustrates 
the ultimate goal of the capital navy, the ability to protect a nation’s interests, wherever 
they may be.  A hundred years before Mahan, American policymakers were already 
offering his principle that national prosperity was connected to the health of the nation’s 
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external trade.  In the analysis of both Mahan and McHenry, this trade required the 
protection of a strong navy. 25 
One of the clearest examples of a policymaker stating Mahan’s argument nearly a 
hundred years before the publication of The Influence of Sea Power upon History was 
that of the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means in 1799, Federalist Robert 
Goodloe Harper.26  In 1797, he succeeded a strong proponent of the naval establishment, 
William Loughton Smith, and also like Smith, Harper was a southern representative who 
supported a large naval establishment.   He was after all, a staunch Federalist and even 
more importantly, Harper was gripped by the South’s worst fear: invasion by a French-
led black army.  Writing to his constituents in March 20, 1799, Harper claimed that 
during the previous summer, the Count d’Hédouville, then French governor of St. 
Domingue, “was preparing to invade the southern states from St. Domingo, with an army 
of blacks…to excite an insurrection among the negroes…and first to subjugate the 
country by their assistance, and then plunder and lay it waste.”27  Horrific tales from 
white planters fleeing the island of St. Domingue and its bloody revolution during the 
1790s only served to reinforce the nagging fear Southerners had of a slave uprising.28  
Harper had previously supported the commerce navy strategic vision (see chapter 2), but 
it seems the specter of a French-induced racial uprising and invasion drove him to 
embrace a capital navy in order to best protect the southern colonies.  Before the outbreak 
of the Quasi War, Harper may have supported a commerce navy because the climate was 
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less favorable to his vision of a capital navy.  In 1797, he was appointed the chairman of 
the House Ways and Means Committee, and he was prepared to do what it took to enact 
his naval strategic vision, including raising taxes to provide the necessary revenue.29  The 
representative from South Carolina voiced his vision of an American capital navy using 
the Mahan’s method of instruction by historical example.  For Harper, the history of 
world sea power led him to a similar conclusion as Mahan.  Speaking of Great Britain in 
nearly the same way Mahan would in the late nineteenth century, Harper declared that “it 
was that navy, and the wealth which commerce, protected by it, poured into her lap, that 
enabled her to support, with glory so unequal a contest…”30  Harper used the example of 
another European nation, Holland, to further his argument by asserting that this 
comparatively tiny nation was able to “maintain not only an equal, but a distinguished 
rank, among the great Powers of Europe” while she supported a “formidable marine.”31  
The South Carolinian was stating the classic ideology of a capital navy, that a strong 
naval force was the surest way to guarantee a nation’s international prestige and security. 
These capital navy buzz words were not the sole purveyance of Federalists, and 
the vision of a capital navy by no means died with the defeat of the Federalist Party by 
the Revolution of 1800.  Throughout 1806, the Secretary of the Navy, Robert Smith, 
pushed for the reinstatement of the 1799 legislation to build 74-gun ships of the line.  
Like Benjamin Stoddert before him, Smith came to believe that abuses of America’s 
maritime trade at the hands of Britain, Spain, and France would only end when the 
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republic fielded a fleet that would earn the respect of Europe.32  In fact, historian Thom 
Armstrong gives Smith all of the credit for formulating Jefferson’s more complex coastal 
navy strategy, and argues that Jefferson consistently resisted this advice.  However, 
Armstrong thesis falls short because it fails to adequately account for Jefferson’s earlier 
writings which indicate his preference for a multi-tiered coastal defense. 
Events like the Leander Affair in 1806 sparked a renewal of the debate over the 
proper strategic naval vision for the republic.  The HMS Leander was a 50-gun ship that 
had previously seen action in the Battle of the Nile and made herself unwelcome in New 
York Harbor by frequently searching American merchant vessels for contraband and 
deserting sailors. In April 1806, the Leander fired a warning shot too close to an 
American ship just off New York City and killed a seaman named John Pierce.33  Amidst 
the push by many Republicans to construct a coastal navy of gunboats, there was a vocal 
minority advocating the return to a capital navy vision.  So, the debate over a republican 
navy was renewed, with capital navy advocates on one side and coastal navy visionaries 
on the other.  Capital navy supporters advocated a revival of the 1799 legislation to build 
74-gun ships, while coastal navy policymakers generally desired more gunboats.  
Somewhere in between was President Jefferson, who clearly supported a coastal navy, 
but was interested in using 74-gun ships as one part of that strategic vision (see chapter 
5). 
Smith sent his recommendations for resuming the construction of 74-gun ships to 
the house committee chair considering the issue, Republican John Dawson of Virginia, 
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who promptly recommended building both gunboats and six ships-of-the-line.34  
 Republican Josiah Masters supported building the 74-gun ships, not because he 
supported Jefferson’s desire for a more varied coastal navy of frigates and a few ships-of-
the-line, but because Masters wanted a more “powerful and respectable” navy.35  Masters 
did not support Adam Smith’s theory of laissez-faire economics extolled by many of his 
colleagues.  By arguing in March 1806 that “neither commerce nor agriculture can 
flourish without protection,” and by asserting that “it is foreign coin which circulates in 
this country…and the quantity of money naturally increases in every country with the 
increase of the wealth,” Masters was stating the classic mercantilist philosophy.36  For 
mercantilists, wealth was a zero-sum game, and if one nation was losing, that meant 
another was winning.  The surest way for a nation to win was through a positive balance 
of trade (exporting more than one imported) and thus accumulate bullion, which was the 
ultimate measure of a state’s wealth and therefore power.37  Even though he was not the 
free trade idealist that Mahan was, Masters too concluded that the lesson of history was 
that national prosperity was tied to external trade and that sea power had played a 
decisive role in the history of international relations.38 
A year later, during the debate over an “An Act to appropriate money for…Gun 
boats” that was signed into law on December 18, 1807, Federalist Jabez Upham of 
Massachusetts chided his peers that “before this could become a great nation at home or 
abroad, that they should have a large Navy; there could be no such thing as taking a 
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commanding ground without a navy.”39  Upham was not excited about the plan to 
construct 188 gunboats, because he wanted a capital navy that would earn respect for the 
new republic all over the world.  In Upham’s mind, the War of Independence was not 
truly over, because “The United States had as much right to travel over the globe as any 
other nation; but they were not independent till they had a navy to defend themselves 
wherever they choose to go.  This nation must depend upon itself.”  Boasting a fine Old 
Testament name (Jabez), Upham justified his strategic vision with a dose of Biblical 
realism.  The Massachusetts representative “believed ‘the original sin and depravity of 
our nature’ required every nation to erect a defen[s]e of this kind.  One nation would 
receive respect from another so long as she could command it, and no longer.”40  But for 
a navalist like Jabez Upham, a coastal navy or commerce navy was not enough; if the 
republic was to be a “great nation” then it needed a capital navy to ensure the “respect” of 
nations everywhere. 
The policymakers who believed that the young republic should build a capital 
navy were outnumbered in the 1790s.  Representatives like Samuel Sewall were navalists 
who were simply a hundred years ahead of their time, living in a republic possessing 
neither the financial means nor the ambition to become an expansive world power.  
However, if little support for a capital navy existed among policymakers during the first 
thirty years of the republic, a great deal of sympathy for the policymakers who advocated 
a capital navy can be found in the historiography of the navy in the early national period.  
From the late nineteenth century through World War II, the historiography is rife with the 
works of scholars who wish that Sewall’s vision was that of the majority and that the U.S. 
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had established a capital navy from the start.  These American naval historians judge the 
Founders’ naval vision to be shortsighted because of their reluctance to build a capital 
navy, particularly pointing to the Navy’s failure to prevent the burning of Washington 
during the War of 1812 as evidence that coastal and commerce navies were insufficient 
naval strategic visions.41 
  Charles Paullin wrote a series of articles published in the U.S. Naval Institute’s 
Proceedings during the height of American navalism in the first two decades of the 
twentieth century.  The writings of Paullin and other historians, perhaps influenced by a 
common misinterpretation of the historical perspective and conclusions of Alfred Thayer 
Mahan, provided support for the nation’s current course of battleship construction.  
Writing from a perspective that powerful nations should strive for command of the sea, 
Paullin endorses the abandonment of the republic’s coastal and commerce navy heritage 
for the powerful identity of a capital navy, epitomized by the early twentieth century 
battleship.42  Paullin begins with the debate over the Naval Act of 1794 and divides the 
argument into Federalists and their opponents from Virginia and Pennsylvania.43  As a 
result of the historically dominant interpretation of Mahan that colors Paullin’s history, 
he is inclined to favor the Federalists over the Antifederalists/Republicans, a trait not only 
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indicative of many naval historians, but historians of his generation in general.44  In 
Paullin’s analysis, creating a Navy Department and a strong navy went hand in hand with 
the Federalist vision of a centrally strong republic, which he tacitly endorses.  Paullin’s 
disdain for Jefferson and the Republican coastal navy plan is clear from his description of 
the Republicans’ decision to build a fleet of gunboats, “All things considered, the 
construction of these vessels during 1804-1807 was a blunder and a misdirection of the 
national resources.”45 
 Abbot and Paullin wrote amidst the nationalism and celebratory spirit surrounding 
Manila Bay, dreadnought battleships, and large battle fleets, while Harold and Margaret 
Sprout reasserted the navalism of Abbot and Paullin on the eve of World War II.  The 
Sprouts advocated a large seagoing navy, especially in light of the looming European 
crisis, and viewed the underdeveloped U.S. Navy as a legacy of Antinavalists and 
Jeffersonian Republicans.46  Advocating a fleet structure consisting of capital ships, the 
Sprouts wrote a complete history of the rise of the U.S. Navy colored by their judgment 
that the coastal and commerce visions were misguided.  To the Sprouts’ credit, they 
eventually admitted that their analysis was overly influenced by their interpretation of 
Mahanian theory.  Specifically, they acknowledged that they were too willing to 
champion the idea that the U.S. should model its navy after that of Great Britain in order 
to wield a comparative influence on the world scene.47  Such bias is evident in their 
condemning judgment of Jefferson and the Republicans for their reliance on a coastal 
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navy consisting of gunboats and their “failure to grasp the basic principles” of the naval 
supremacy of a capital navy, consisting of a fleet of 74-gun ships-of-the-line.48 
 In the last thirty years, historians have moved away from the navalism that 
colored many of the earlier works during the first half of the twentieth century.  As 
previously mentioned, historian Craig Symonds revises the historiography in an 
important way by demonstrating the rational thinking behind the opponents of a large 
navy in the early national period.  However, as historian Elizabeth Nuxoll points out, 
Symonds’ approach of highlighting the ideological conflict between navalists and 
antinavalists is misleading because it exaggerates the prevalence of navalist thought 
among Federalists and other nationalistic policymakers in the 1790s and early 1800s.49  
Policymakers like Josiah Parker whose support for a capital navy could be construed as 
late-eighteenth century navalism were the exception, and not nearly as common as 
Symonds’ analysis of the congressional debates would suggest.  Instead, a close 
inspection of the congressional record from 1794 to 1807 reveals very little navalist 
thought, and the few policymakers who dared to suggest a more grand vision of a 
republican navy did so knowing they would be voicing a very unpopular position.  
Instead, with the advent of the Revolution of 1800, the navalists’ capital navy vision was 
abandoned as the new president, Thomas Jefferson, revived the commerce navy vision 
prevalent in the early 1790s.  Then, in 1806, Jefferson and the Republican-dominated 
Congress engineered a shift to a naval vision solely concerned with the protection of 
America’s coastline:  the coastal navy vision.
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Chapter 5:  Coastal Navy, 1806-1812 
The Republican Revolution of 1800 affected naval policy no less than any other 
aspect of American political life.  The strategic vision of a capital navy was interrupted 
nearly as soon as it was initiated; and likewise, Adams’ vision of a regional navy was 
quickly pushed aside like an old newspaper.  Efforts by navalists during 1799 were 
undone by the enactment of the “Act providing for a Naval peace establishment” of 
March 3, 1801.  This piece of Republican legislation mandated the selling off of all the 
ships of the U. S. Navy except for thirteen frigates, six of which were to be retained on 
active duty.  The rest were to be preserved on land for future need.1  Naval budgets were 
reined in, and by 1810 the total federal expenditures on the navy was still only 
$1,654,244.20, representing 12% of the total government expenses that year.2  The irony 
of the situation was that while Congress moved to reduce the naval force, President 
Jefferson was forced to redeploy the Mediterranean squadron after the Pasha of Tripoli, 
Yusuf Karamanli, declared war on American commerce in February 26, 1801 (see 
chapter 2).  Jefferson was forced to either accede to the tribute demands of Karamanli or 
redeploy the Mediterranean squadron in order to defend American interests in the 
Mediterranean.3  So, while Congress in effect pushed for no naval force at all, the 
President was forced by international politics to reinstitute the commerce navy vision of 
1794-1796.   
By 1805, peace was reached with Tripoli, but Jefferson had new problems on his 
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hands.  America’s relationship with Great Britain took a turn for the worse in May of 
1805, when British judges overturned the Polly decision in cases involving the American 
vessels Aurora and Essex.  The admiralty judges ruled that the ultimate destination of 
goods would henceforth determine their “national character” and that re-exportation no 
longer “transformed the national identity” of a ship’s cargo, in part because American 
merchants had abused the Polly rule.4  Then, in October, the Royal Navy achieved 
supremacy of the seas after defeating the French and Spanish fleets off Cape Trafalgar.  
This freed up the Royal Navy to enforce the decisions in the Aurora and Essex cases, and 
during the fall of 1805, the Royal Navy seized over 200 American vessels trading in the 
West Indies.  As war with Great Britain began to pose an increasingly real threat from 
1806 to 1812, policymakers responded by formulating a new strategic vision of the navy, 
one more focused on coastal defense.5   
Many policymakers shared Jefferson’s vision of a coastal navy for the purposes of 
defending the republic.  In his often quoted Notes on Virginia (1782), Jefferson wrote, “A 
land army would be useless for offence, and not the best nor safest instrument of 
defen[s]e.  For either of these purposes, the sea is the field on which we should meet [a] 
European enemy.”6  He concluded that “to aim at such a navy as the greater nations of 
Europe possess, would be a foolish and wicked waste of the energies of our 
countrymen… a small naval force then is sufficient for us, and a small one is necessary.”7  
Historians have often mischaracterized the Jeffersonian strategic vision as “anti-navy” or 
as simply favoring a coastal navy composed of gunboats, to the exclusion of any other 
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vessels.8   Naval historians have not only welded Jefferson to gunboats, but have also 
often condemned him for building and advocating the gunboat navy that failed to 
adequately defend the United States during the War of 1812.  Citing Mahan’s disdain for 
gunboats in Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812, these historians evaluate the 
naval policies of the early national period using their own narrow interpretations of 
Mahan as a litmus test; a practice that often leads to ringing condemnations of early naval 
policy.9 
Historian Gene Smith reacts against previous historians’ disdain for Jefferson’s 
gunboat coastal navy and their historicizing and judgmental spirit.10  Tired of the anti-
Jeffersonian bias, Smith seeks to dig deeper than previous scholars and probe why 
Jefferson and his fellow Republican Congressmen trusted the nation’s defense so heavily 
to the gunboat and explore the role envisioned for this much-maligned craft.  Most 
notable is Smith’s groundbreaking effort to situate the gunboat not only in the broad 
context of naval history, but more importantly, the larger picture of the early republic.11 
Seizing upon Jefferson’s message to Congress in 1807 regarding the defensive potential 
of gunboats, naval historians traditionally characterize gunboats as the dominant 
component of Jefferson’s naval strategy.12  Smith, building upon the work of Julia 
MacLeod, has corrected this analysis by revealing that Jefferson envisioned a multi-tiered 
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defensive naval strategy that included ships-of-the-line, frigates, and smaller vessels in 
addition to a network of gunboats; while a coastal navy consisting of gunboats was 
largely Congress’ fixation.13  As noted in chapter 4, even capital navy advocates used 
Jefferson’s Notes on Virginia to bolster the argument for ships-of-the-line.  Jefferson 
clearly believed that finances should not hold back the construction of a navy, figuring 
that a force of 30 ships-18 ships-of-the-line and 12 frigates-was supportable.14 
 Diplomacy and economic sanctions were also important parts of Jefferson’s 
coastal navy strategic vision.  Determined to avoid a war with Europe at all costs, Co-
ministers to Great Britain James Monroe and William Pinkney endeavored 
unsuccessfully throughout 1806 and 1807 to address American grievances with Great 
Britain.15  Resisting pressure by many to regard the attack on the USS Chesapeake by the 
HMS Leopard as an act of war, Jefferson instead chose to exercise a non-militaristic 
solution by imposing an embargo on American goods on December 22, 1807.16  The 
Leopard’s actions certainly could have been considered an act of war.  On June 22, 1807, 
10 miles from Norfolk, Virginia, the 56-gun HMS Leopard hailed the 36-gun USS 
Chesapeake.  The Leopard’s captain, S. P. Humphreys, had heard local rumors while in 
Norfolk that several British deserters were on board the Chesapeake, but the captain of 
the Chesapeake, James Barron, knew better than to allow his ship to be searched.  So, he 
refused and the Leopard called his bluff, opening fire and in twenty minutes laid waste to 
the U. S. frigate.  With three dead, eighteen wounded (including himself), and after 
taking twenty-two shots in the hull and irreparable damage to the masts, Barron 
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surrendered.  He allowed the seizure of four suspected deserters and offered his ship as a 
prize to Humphreys, who refused, unwilling to further compound his war-like actions.  
The sight of the battered American warship limping into port in Hampton Roads incensed 
not only the local population, but Americans all along the seaboard (see chapter 6), 
including many congressmen.17  
However, despite the furor over the attack on the Chesapeake, Jefferson was not 
about to abandon his methods, and he certainly wanted to avoid war with Great Britain.  
Instead, he turned to economic sanctions.  Jefferson steadfastly believed that American 
exports were so important to Great Britain and Europe that Britain would be forced to the 
bargaining table on problematic issues like impressment.  The President was confident 
that any resultant loss in revenue by the American economy would be inconsequential.  
The embargo proved entirely unpopular in America and inconsequential in Europe, and 
Congress repealed the measure just over a year later, in February 1809.18 
  In addition to being multifaceted, Jefferson’s naval strategy was flexible.  
Although he preferred a coastal navy, when American commerce was threatened by the 
Barbary States, he was willing to support wielding a commerce navy in its defense in the 
Mediterranean.  Jefferson even foresaw the day in the not so distant future when the 
United States would field a capital navy, writing from Paris in 1788 that Congress should 
have recognized John Paul Jones with the rank of rear-admiral, because Jones was 
“young enough to see the day when we shall be more populous than the whole British 
dominions and able to fight them ship to ship.  We should procure him then every 
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possible opportunity of acquiring experience.”19   But, while this is an important 
correction to historiography’s mistaken consensus of Jeffersonian naval strategy, it does 
not add to the understanding of why Congressmen were such willing advocates of a 
coastal navy, particularly one composed of gunboats. 
Lost amidst the historiographical debates over the wisdom of a gunboat-centered 
policy is the reality that by 1805, the debate over the formation of a republican navy was 
shifting from a commerce-centered debate to one primarily concerned with securing 
America’s coastline.  Republican John Smilie’s declaration that “there was no country on 
earth whose commerce would justify the creation of a navy merely for its protection” and 
that he “would rather…give up the whole trade than protect it by a navy” demonstrated 
how the discussion of a republican navy was changing.20  This change in strategic vision 
was clearly part of the larger Revolution of 1800.  It also seems evident that the 
developments of 1805 played an important role as America’s deteriorating relationship 
with Great Britain introduced the possibility of an invasion.  Suddenly, many 
policymakers forgot the old argument that the United States did not need a coastal navy 
because Europe was “3,000 miles away.”  The increasing value of the republic’s coastline 
only added to the concern. Representative Uri Tracy of New York stressed the 
vulnerability of the private property of his constituents, valued at over one hundred 
million dollars.21  The former missionary to American Indians did not expect to fortify 
New York City “like Babylon,” but he called on his fellow policymakers to think of a 
coastal navy as defending “their own property” as much as the defense of the hundreds of 
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thousands living in America’s coastal cities.22 
Impressments and depredations against American commerce had been an ongoing 
problem since the start of the French Revolutionary Wars in the 1790s.  However, after 
1805, the actions of the Royal Navy within American territorial waters grew more blatant 
than ever before.  Republican Gurdon Mumford’s outrage over the murder of an 
American seaman outside of the New York City harbor by the HMS Leander in 1806 
demonstrated the growing concern over similar episodes taking place along the republic’s 
coastline.  Anger over these British incursions into American territorial waters peaked in 
June 1807, as a result of the Chesapeake-Leopard Affair.23  “Will the United States,” 
Mumford asked his colleagues, “submit to the humiliating degradation of having its own 
citizens murdered within its own limits...I hope we shall, in justice to ourselves and the 
duty we owe our country, pursue such prompt and efficient measures as will more 
effectually protect our own sea shores.”24   Mumford thought he exemplified a “plain 
republican” by “seeking neither office, nor courting popularity” and remaining “firmly 
attached” to the “true interest” of his country.25   Accordingly, the coastal navy Mumford 
advocated would not serve the interests of merchants or manufacturers; it would be a true 
republican navy because it would serve the only proper interest:  that of the republic as a 
whole.  The former private secretary to Benjamin Franklin acknowledged the differences 
of opinion over the viability of a republican navy, but pleaded with his peers that 
“whatever may be the objections of some gentlemen to the wooden walls of a navy, and 
however we may differ on that point…I hope we shall ever be united in one sentiment, in 
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the defen[s]e of our own shores.”26  Gurdon Mumford was not to be disappointed.  
During the summer of 1807, many in Washington thought the republic was headed for 
war with Great Britain, and most policymakers were beginning to support some form of a 
coastal navy, though they differed on its shape.27    Ultimately, Congress passed the “Act 
to appropriate money for the providing of an additional number of Gun Boats” that 
authorizing the purchase or construction of 188 gunboats.28  However, gunboats, frigates, 
privateers and even 74-gun ships-of-the-line were all offered as visions of the young 
republic’s proposed coastal navy.  The arguments of Mumford and Tracy were 
characteristic of the most popular strategy of defense among policymakers during the mid 
1800s:  gunboats combined with coastal fortifications. 
Gunboats 
Gunboats were small, shallow draft vessels that could be stored on land until their 
moment of need.  They were familiar to policymakers because of their role during the 
American Revolution in defending the Delaware River and the northern frontier on Lake 
Champlain.  Nearly all of the countries of Europe and the Mediterranean employed 
gunboats, and Russia had actually employed them to success against Turkish ships-of-
the-line at the mouth of the Dnieper River in 1788.29  Many of the policymakers who 
supported the idea of a coastal navy built around gunboats espoused views similar to 
those expressed by Republican Samuel Latham Mitchill of New York in November 1807.  
As Mitchill explained to his fellow Senators, “It was not his intention to recommend the 
construction of a Navy” which would involve the republic in the pointless contests by the 
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European Powers for the control of the seas.  “His only object,” continued Mitchill, “was 
to provide a force sufficient to protect our acknowledged territory, and to preserve peace 
within our seaports and harbors.”30  The coastal navy offered by the future founder of 
Rutgers Medical School provided the perfect option for Republicans like George Clinton, 
who took Mitchill’s seat in the House when the New Yorker was elected to the Senate.31  
Clinton, like many Republicans, feared the expense and implications of a conventional, 
large peacetime naval force, but was willing to admit that “the want of a naval force was 
then severely felt…of the kind to chastise marauders and pirates, and to protect our 
commerce and defend our ports.”32  Policymakers arguing for a coastal navy of gunboats 
were not simply attempting to provide the cheapest navy possible (although that was a 
major selling point), but men like Republican Roger Nelson actually believed that 
gunboats were “the best species of defense.”33  Born on a plantation in Maryland, the 
representative was a veteran of the Revolutionary War and wounded at the Battle of 
Camden, so no one was going to accuse Nelson of being weak on defense.34 
But this was a defense that required clarification.  Thomas Jefferson’s son-in-law, 
John Wayles Eppes informed his fellow representatives that he never considered the 
gunboats “as answering the purpose of a navy.”35  Rather, the Republican from Virginia 
regarded them as a “proper substitute for expensive fortifications.”36  Eppes’ Republican 
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colleague from Pennsylvania, John Smilie, voiced the underlying fear of these men:  if a 
conventional coastal navy of frigates were built for defense it would draw the young 
republic into disastrous confrontations with European Powers.37  An Irish immigrant, and 
former Antifederalist, Smilie wanted the republic to forge a new way and forgo the 
building of capital navies, hoping “it never would be said, that they ought to defend 
themselves beyond their own shores.”38  Despite the rhetoric of some policymakers, 
Smilie was “of opinion that there is no danger at present” and that America was “not at 
present threatened with war.”  However, despite his lack of trepidation and opposition to 
navies consisting of larger ships, Smilie was ready “to go as far as the Government thinks 
proper in the building of gunboats.”39  More money spent for fortifications and 
emplacements would be a waste, and Smilie “believed that all they could do at present 
was to increase the number of gunboats.”40  These smaller craft fit his concept of a 
republican coastal navy perfectly since no standing or established force was required.  
The gunboats could be stored on land until the time of need arose, and they did not 
require permanent corps of seamen and officers to man them.  Gunboats were the ideal 
solution for policymakers who wanted to avoid standing armies (and navies) and rely on 
the militia concept of defense as much as possible. 
Most policymakers were strong proponents of gunboats, but others needed 
convincing.41  Jefferson’s most outspoken Republican critic, John Randolph of Virginia, 
and his fellow Republican Andrew Gregg of Pennsylvania were skeptical of gunboats and 
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needed more evidence of their capabilities before they were willing to invest so heavily in 
a coastal navy consisting solely of the small, shallow water craft.42  To this end, President 
Jefferson attempted to assuage the fears of doubting representatives by arguing that 
gunboats were employed by “every modern maritime nation” and particularly, that in the 
Mediterranean “few harbors are without this article of protection.”  Proposing that 150 of 
the craft be built, Jefferson underscored their low cost in repairs and maintenance while 
stored in sheds during times of peace.43 
Ultimately, gunboats were an appealing option because of the vision of a coastal 
navy which they offered.   As Republican James Fisk of Vermont summed up, unlike 
frigates, gunboats precluded a formal naval personnel corps and “were not calculated to 
go abroad.”  When all was said and done, the Universalist minister concluded that 
gunboats were quite simply the “cheapest and the best” means of defense.44 
Frigates 
The faith in a coastal navy solely consisting of gunboats was not shared by all 
policymakers and a minority advocated a more diverse coastal navy using frigates to 
augment the gunboats.  Federalist Jonathan Moseley from Connecticut endeavored in 
February 1807 to convince his peers that while he agreed that “the principle naval force” 
should be composed of gunboats, he thought that in some cases, a “single frigate…might 
be employed to much greater advantage.  Why not,” asked the New England lawyer, 
“have them on hand?”45  Moseley’s fellow Federalist William Milnor of Pennsylvania 
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also argued that gunboats and frigates could work in concert with each other to greater 
effectiveness.46  Despite his party affiliation and his Philadelphia mercantile interests, 
Milnor was not attempting to lay the foundations for a capital navy even though he 
believed that “the construction of a few frigates would be expedient.”47  To those who 
might suspect the intentions of a Federalist, Milnor countered that “he was not of opinion 
that they ought to have a large navy, nor was he a friend of one,” but maintained that 
even a single frigate employed for coastal defense would compel the enemy at all times 
to be on their guard.”48   
This vision of a more diverse coastal navy was not new to the post-1805 debates.  
Republican John Swanwick of Pennsylvania, a policymaker concerned with protecting 
the interests of merchants, manufacturers, and farmers, had argued as far back as 1794, 
and again in 1796, that the republic would be best served by a coastal navy consisting of 
frigates operating specifically in defense of the republic’s coastline.49  While Swanwick 
stressed the contributions that foreign trade had made to the economy of the new republic 
by bringing profits to “merchants, mechanics, and indirectly to the agricultural interests,” 
he was not advocating the protection of overseas trade like policymakers who advocated 
a commerce navy.  “What,” Swanwick asked his fellow legislators, “would the Powers of 
Europe think of us?  That whilst we were laying the foundations of new cities and 
flourishing in every respect beyond calculation,” and yet were “alarmed” at spending a 
few hundred thousand dollars to build a few frigates.  “Will they not say,” Swanwick 
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continued, “they are building cities and leaving them defen[s]eless?”50  Swanwick’s 
concern was with a coastal defense, and in this way he was a marked departure from his 
contemporaries of the 1790s who advocated building frigates for interdictory missions on 
the behalf of American commerce.  “Indeed there was no security against the 
bombardment of the new city,” Swanwick lectured the representatives, “or any other of 
their possessions, whenever an enemy chose to undertake the business, their extensive 
coast being wholly defen[s]eless.”51  However, the Philadelphian, a so-called 
“mercantile-republican,” was concerned with more than the cities along the coast.  If the 
republic possessed a coastal navy of frigates, Swanwick continued, Congress “would not 
have heard the other day of a vessel being taken near the New York light-house, or of 
insignificant privateers sometimes plundering us almost in our own harbors.”52  
Swanwick was willing to admit that frigates might not prevent the seizure of American 
ships along the coast, but he believed the mere knowledge that the republic possessed 
such ships would cause foreign captains to think twice before sailing their ships along the 
American coast.  Embracing the deterrent potential of a coastal navy, Swanwick was not 
completely abandoning commerce like some advocates of a coastal navy, rather he 
thought that inter-coastal trade would be secured as a byproduct of the coastal navy. 
Swanwick’s argument was a departure from the strategic vision of frigates 
protecting overseas commerce, and even in 1794, it had attracted a small minority of 
policymakers opposed to the idea of a commerce navy.  Representative James Madison 
from Virginia had strongly opposed the formation of a commerce navy of frigates, but 
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was willing to endorse their construction for a coastal navy.53  Defending the coast 
“against pirates and privateers” was a different matter than to “send them to a distant sea 
to effect an object to which they would be inadequate.”54  This argument by the 
republic’s future president summarized the vision of the advocates of a coastal navy, 
whether they were in the 1790s or 1800s.  Building ships to defend America’s coast was 
fine, but anything else was bound to involve the republic in unnecessary wars, fall short 
of the intended purpose, and prove prohibitively expensive.  In many ways the arguments 
of policymakers advocating a coastal navy were isolationist.  They recognized that 
commerce and international relationships were important, but did not believe they were 
so important as to necessitate the sending of American warships to the other side of the 
Atlantic in order to defend the republic’s interests.  But, as John Swanwick reminded the 
policymakers trusting in the “three thousand or four thousand mile distance” between 
Europe and America, “they had possessions very near us-their naval and land forces 
could easily approach us.”55  
The fear of invasion that Swanwick attempted to impart to his peers went largely 
unrecognized until 1807.  By 1809, deteriorating relations to with Great Britain altered 
policymakers’ sense of security and even led them to endorse the use of frigates as a part 
of the coastal navy.  The “Act authorizing the employment of an additional naval force” 
enacted on January 31, 1809, directed that four of the frigates laid up in ordinary (stored 
on land) after the 1801 Naval Peace Establishment were to be fitted out and manned.  
These frigates were to be used along with the other active frigates as a true coastal navy, 
                                                 
53 Annals of Congress, 3rd Congress, 1st sess., 433. 
54 Annals of Congress, 4th Congress, 1st sess., 877-878. 




“stationed at such ports and places on the sea coast as [the President] may deem most 
expedient.”56 
74s  
 President Thomas Jefferson’s gentle nudging of Congress in 1805 to build 74-gun 
ships-of-the-line touched off a debate amongst policymakers as to the true intentions of 
building ships that traditionally represented a capital navy (see chapter 4).57  Jefferson 
was advocating building 74s as merely one piece in his integrated strategy of defense:  a 
coastal navy consisting of gunboats, frigates, and 74-gun capital ships.58  Policymakers 
leery of the establishment of a capital navy were not so sure, and it was up to the 
supporters of Jefferson’s vision of a coastal navy to convince them.  A supporter of 
Jefferson’s version of a coastal navy with a unique reason for advocating the construction 
of 74-gun ships was Republican Mathew Lyon of Kentucky.  Sensitive to the interests of 
western traders and merchants, Lyon was a proponent of a coastal navy as a means to 
secure the mouth of the Mississippi, which he feared “any nation with whom we have a 
difference, possessing a single line-of-battle ship, may block up” and thus destroy the 
republic’s important western trade.59  Lyon recognized another important mission for a 
coastal navy, ensuring the security of America’s inland waterways. 
 Skeptics of a coastal navy relying solely on gunboats were not limited to 
twentieth century naval historians.  Federalist Josiah Quincy of Massachusetts embraced 
Jefferson’s interest in building 74-gun ships in April 1806 because he doubted the 
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effectiveness of gunboats in defending the coast from heavier ships-of-the-line.  The 
graduate of Harvard recalled of a story from the American Revolution when a British 44-
gun frigate ran aground in the Delaware River and suffered little damage despite the shots 
of numerous patriot gunboats.60  Quincy was willing to admit that gunboats could be 
useful in certain situations, but he was not comfortable with their many fervent advocates 
in Congress and lamented that gunboats had seemed to become “a substitute for all other 
means of defen[s]e.”61  Somewhat humorously he noted, “Now-a-days, sir, put what you 
will into the crucible, whether it be seventy-fours, or frigates, or land batteries, the result 
is the same; after due sweltering in the legislative furnace, there comes out nothing but 
gunboats.”62  Less humorous to Quincy was the problem posed by a New York City 
harbor often too choppy for gunboats to operate effectively.  However, Quincy pointed 
out that this would not be a problem for other types of vessels, and that a “ship-of-the-
line chooses its own time to attack.” 63  
 Josiah Quincy was concerned with more than strategies of coastal defense, and 
like the proponents of a commerce navy he stressed the stake all classes of Americans 
had in a republic whose secure coast would enable commerce to flourish.  The 
Massachusetts lawyer argued that this growing market had created “within the country an 
immense fund of internal consumption,” and “merchants, tradesmen, mechanics, seamen, 
and laborers of every class and description” counted on the republic’s trade “for that 
profit which makes a great portion of their happiness.”64  This was not to exclude 
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agriculture by any means, because Quincy agreed with the argument that “the farmer is 
bound to commerce by a thousand intimate ties” and played an important role in “the 
supply of the wants of this internal consumption” of the republic’s growing market 
economy.65 
 Ultimately, a navy for the purpose of coastal defense had many supporters, 
regardless of their differences over its exact makeup.   Republican George Clinton, son of 
Vice President George Clinton, “was not in favor of expansive navies or standing 
armies,” but like most policymakers “was clearly in the opinion that we should employ 
the force we possess in the defen[s]e of the country.”66  Even John Williams, defeated in 
his vision of a informal commerce navy consisting of privateers, did not oppose a coastal 
navy.67  While representatives disagreed over the exact ships that should constitute a 
coastal navy, Federalist and Republican policymakers alike agreed that for the republic to 
succeed, its citizens needed a strong sense of security.  Defenders of agriculture and 
mercantile interests both recognized the importance of protecting the rights of property 
within the confines of the American continent.  In this respect, the advocates of a coastal 
navy were not so different from the advocates of a commerce navy.  However, after 1805, 
a distinguishing argument of those who fought for a coastal navy was their growing 
concern over the defensive vulnerability of a commercial republic.  Drawing common 
cause with the Republic of Ragusa, which he claimed to be “the last of the republics of 
the ancient world,” Federalist James Elliot of Vermont stated in December 1806 that her 
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fate should be a lesson to America.68  Elliot declared that “every republican on earth 
ought to shed a tear” for Napoleon’s capture of Ragusa, especially since like America, the 
Ragusans “were a simple, peaceful, unambitious [sic], industrious, virtuous, republican 
people.”69  The Ragusans were “Friends of all the world,” the Vermont lawyer argued 
and these model republican people were now “slaves” because the “Ragusans were 
hostile” to the interests of the Emperor of France.  If it were not for America’s 
geographic position, Elliot concluded that she would follow the same fate, for like the 
Ragusans, America was a republic which had too long ignored the realities of European 
politics.70  Although Elliot reassured his fellow representatives that he was “no friend to 
large armies and navies” he condemned America’s “Lilliputian navy” as a “disgrace” to 
the republic and “the ridicule of Europe.”71  While failing to offer specific steps to take 
beyond establishing a committee to investigate the best means for carrying out 
Jefferson’s call for a coastal navy, Elliot characterized a new concern among 
policymakers that while defense of commerce had long occupied the discussions of what 
kind of navy to establish, the importance of a coastal navy had been perilously ignored.72
                                                 
68 The Republic of Ragusa was a maritime city-state located on the Adriatic coast of present-day Croatia.  It 
fell to the French Empire in 1806.  Annals of Congress, 9th Congress, 2nd sess., 163. 
69 Annals of Congress, 9th Congress, 2nd sess., 163. 
70 “Elliot, James,” Biographical Directory, http://bioguide.congress.gov/ scripts/biodisplay.pl?index= 
E000122, (accessed April 28, 2006); Annals of Congress, 9th Congress, 2nd sess., 161-163. 





Chapter 6:  The Public’s Views on a Naval Force 
 One of the most overlooked aspects of the historiography of the U. S. Navy is 
how the public influenced the formulation of naval policy during the early national 
period.  Most histories about the early years of the U.S. Navy, this thesis included, are 
heavy on the ideas and writings of prominent congressmen, presidents, and cabinet 
members.  In so far as they address the popular sentiments regarding an American naval 
force, most naval histories just summarize public outbursts in a general sense in order to 
lend significance to various historic flashpoints like the Chesapeake-Leopard Affair.1  
Clearly, the public voice needs to be incorporated into the narrative of the establishment 
of a republican navy.  The question remains, how best to do this? 
 The most obvious answer is to peruse the newspapers of the 1790s and 1800s for 
the public reaction to the congressional debates over naval policy.  A reasonable place to 
start, early newspapers like the Philadelphia Gazette of the United States and the 
Philadelphia Aurora do contain many articles, advertisements, editorials, and new clips 
pertaining to maritime matters.  Concern over the actions of privateers instantly jumps 
out as one important example of public opinion on maritime issues in the early republic.  
During the late 1790s, this concern revolved around the French privateers unleashed by 
the Directory’s decision in 1797 to attack American commerce by declaring all British 
goods on neutral ships open to seizure.  According to the Directory, any American vessel 
could be seized that did not contain a “role d’équipage” containing a list of cargo and 
passengers, composed according to French standards.  No American merchant vessels 
                                                 





carried such lists, and so the Directory’s ruling in effect authorized widespread seizures 
of American ships by French privateers.  It was a war on American commerce in 
retaliation for the Jay Treaty, which the French interpreted as an abridgment of the 1783 
treaties.2 
 When ships were seized, the newspapers responded.  One example is the posting 
in the May 26, 1798 edition of the Philadelphia Aurora, under the title of “Highly 
Alarming!”  The news clip warned, “It is said, that there are six French privateers 
Crusiers [sic] now on our coast, to take all American vessels, with British property on 
board!”  Under this informative bit was the heading, “Highly Alarming, Again.”  The 
ensuing information passed on to the readers of the Aurora revealed the complexity of the 
young republic’s attempts to maintain the neutrality of its commerce 
It is said that there are ten sail of British Ships of war on the American coast, to 
put in execution the orders of the Duke of Portland, by taking all American 
vessels bound to or from the ports of France, Spain, or Holland, having the 
produce of those countries on board.  A pretty pickle of filth for the United States 
to digest.  Britons are opposed to us, in all our commercial concerns with those 
powers which furnish us with cash, and the French opposed to us in our 
commercial connections with British which serve to drain us of the circulating 
species, to pay for them.  France gives us Hard Money, and the English give us 
fashionable Bonnets, shoes, etc.  Who then won’t be United to fight the French?  
Bonnets, and Shoes, and heavy debt, is certainly preferable to hard Money and a 
profitable trade, besides which we shall get connected with our old friends the 
British, and disconnected with our old enemies the French.  The British burnt 
Charlestown, etc, but who would not be united to clasp them to our arms, rather 
than the French, who aided us to check their conflagrations.3 
 
The sarcasm of the Aurora is palpable, and highlights the division of American society in 
the late 1790s between those who wanted to declare war on France, and those who 
supported the French Revolution (and excused its excesses) over the monarchy of Great 
Britain.  The perspective voiced by the Aurora in May 1798 reveals that some Americans 
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did not support Adams’ naval strategy that brought America to the brink of war against 
France.  The Aurora was clearly such a paper, even going so far as to defend the actions 
of French privateers and decrying the “insults to the flag” of British naval commanders.4  
In May 1798, the Aurora published a poem by Jonathan Pindar, “addressed to the 
Yeomanry of the United States” entitled “The Farmer and the Sailor:  A Fable” that 
warned the farmers of the republic from joining the nation’s new naval force.  The 
concluding moral lesson of “The Farmer and the Sailor” was clear 
 Thus, if to gratify the Tar 
 Ye FARMERS, ye engage in WAR, 
 Thousands will surely find their graves, 
 Like honest PLOUGHSHARE in the waves.5 
 
 Just a few months before, the Aurora had published an attack on Adams’ regional 
navy strategic vision from “A Boston Correspondent” 
If the United States adopt the principle that “A PUBLIC DEBT IS A PUBLIC 
BLESSING,” the sentiments of the President on the subject of a MARINE are 
perfectly right….Should the United States adopt the system of a marine they must 
immediately throw a debt upon themselves, beyond any advantages they could 
derive from their Commerce.6   
 
This critic of Adams’ naval building programs feared not only the cost incurred by 
navies, but like anti-navy policymakers, the Boston Correspondent feared the threat 
posed by navies to a republican society.  Arguing that “PRESS GANGS are the natural 
attendants of a navy,” the Boston Correspondent cautioned his fellow citizens not to be 
deceived by the rhetoric of their representatives.  He believed that 
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The idea of a marine to protect our merchants and seamen, is one of those 
common catch terms to deceive these classes of citizens:  the commerce of 
England is burdened, instead of being benefited by their navy, for the Influence 
on their property, would not be in any proportion to their Duties for the support of 
a navy.7  
 
Others like the “Quaker in Politics,” the famous English chemist, philosopher, and 
dissenting clergyman Joseph Priestley, believed that merchants had no right to expect 
their commerce to be protected by the public.  Instead, overseas trade should be at the 
merchant’s “own ris[k], and the country, which receives more injury than advantage, and 
whole peace is endangered by it, should not indemnify him for any loss.”  Furthermore, 
the Quaker in Politics continued that “the expense of building one man of war would 
suffice to make a bridge over a river of considerable extent,” while “the morals of 
lab[or]ers are much better preferred than those of seamen, and especially those of 
soldiers.”8 
The Republican Aurora clearly overstated in purporting to represent the 
“indignation in every American bosom.”9  While opposition papers like the Aurora were 
skeptical of Adams’ military and naval preparations in 1798 and 1799, others like the 
Philadelphia Gazette of the United States represented those Americans who supported the 
President’s actions.  This perspective believed that “without a well disciplined army and a 
navy, we should in a little time have neither army, navy, loans, taxes, liberty, or 
government.”10  Not only were naval and military preparations right and proper for a 
republic, but the Gazette argued that “France lowered her tone of insolence, and menace 
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to the United States” after the commencement of preparations for defense.11  It was the 
classic Federalist perspective; that “Armies and Navies are expensive things, but what 
country can long maintain its rights, commerce, and independence without them?”12 
While the Aurora was running “The Farmer and the Sailor,” the Gazette of the 
United States published a long call to arms penned by an anonymous author under the 
name Fabricius. Stressing that “[f]or five years have we been insulted as well as injured 
by the French,” Fabricius chastised his fellow Americans 
By Heaven!  [I]t shall not be said that the Americans of 76 were succeeded by a 
submissive and degenerate race, that tamely surrendered up the liberties and 
independence of their country without even a struggle…My brave young 
Countrymen, you who are coming forward and devoting yourselves to the service 
of your country…let not the sacred flame expire…13 
 
These reactions in Philadelphia newspapers reflected the escalating tension between 
France and the United States that followed Adams’ April 1798 publication of the XYZ 
papers.  This is hardly surprising, because when one searches the newspapers of the early 
national period for public comments on naval matters, one does not usually find much 
relevant material unless one examines the weeks that followed such a historical 
“flashpoint.” Two similar naval flashpoints were the declaration of war by Tripoli’s 
leader Yusuf Karamanli on February 26, 1801 and the attack on the USS Chesapeake by 
the HMS Leopard on June 22, 1807.14  
 As was previously demonstrated, the difficulty of securing the republic’s 
commerce in the Mediterranean helped motivate Congress to enact naval legislation well 
before the 1800s.  The Naval Act of 1794 was passed in reaction to the Dey of Algiers’ 
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demand for tribute, which, after it was granted, led to the decision in 1796 to cut the 
frigate building program in half.  What distinguished the debate in 1801 over how best to 
respond to the renewal of problems with the Barbary States was that Republicans began 
to support armed retaliation much more forcefully than in the 1790s.  Then, many 
policymakers, including John Adams, advocated paying off the Dey, as had been the 
custom of European nations.  Ultimately, this strategy won out in the 1790s, but now in 
the early years of the nineteenth century, with Thomas Jefferson and the Republican 
Party in power, the reaction was different. 
 The Republican editor of the New York American Citizen and General 
Advertiser, James Cheetham, wanted policymakers to know that in many citizens’ 
opinion, “the first duty of a government is the protection of its citizens in their lawful 
pursuits and enterprises, whether by sea or land.  This right of protection imposes a duty 
upon our government to protect them in the Mediterranean as well as on our coast.”15  As 
has been constantly restated, one common argument of those who opposed the commerce 
and capital navy building programs of the 1790s was that these programs could not be 
afforded by a republic, especially one that was struggling to pay off its Revolutionary-era 
debts.  Republicans had always been some of the loudest voices against protecting the 
commerce or honor of the nation on the seas, but now Republican papers were declaring 
that “for the honor of our country” they hoped that Congress would not pay off the 
Barbary States as it had in the 1790s.  Expense was no longer a valid reason, countered 
the American Citizen, questioning “why then should we give up our rights in the 
Mediterranean on account of the expen[s]e which may attend supporting them…we know 
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that so slavish a spirit does not pervade the mind of our executive…And we hope it is 
reserved to Mr. Jefferson to liberate us.”  Why the sudden change in Republican attitude 
in the summer of 1801?  Because, as the American Citizen concluded, “it is the desire of 
every man in the United States that we be freed from the shackles of the Mediterranean 
powers” and “it would be far better for our republican cannon to thunder in the ear of the 
barbarians than to pay them a tribute.”16   
 Publishers Samuel Pennington and Stephen Gould of the Newark, N.J. Centinel of 
Freedom stressed in June 1801 the contradiction of Adams’ administration’s “millions 
for defense but not a cent for tribute” policy towards France, while the Barbary States 
continued to receive tribute.  They hoped, like their Republican colleague, James 
Cheetham, that this shameful practice would not continue.17  The next day, an anonymous 
Republican author of a article in the Philadelphia Aurora blamed the British for 
manipulating the Barbary States like some grand puppeteer, because “the commerce of 
the United States in the Mediterranean has been a source of jealousy and discontent to the 
government of Great Britain ever since the treaty of peace in ’83.”18  As in 1798, the 
Aurora still favored France over Great Britain, but now, the paper reflected a growing 
sentiment among Republicans that a defense of American overseas trade was not only 
desirable, but necessary. 
 After the establishment of a blockade and a series of battles in 1803 and 1804, the 
Republican editor of the Trenton, New Jersey, True American celebrated in January 1805 
that on the occasion of the new year, he was  
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able to recall the reader’s attention to their progress…[W]ithin the last year, our 
defensive navy has added greatly to the dignity of our country, and its officers and 
seamen, by their skill and bravery, have given an idea of what they can and will 
do, when necessity commands their employment in such enterprises.19   
 
Wilson applauded his republic’s commerce navy, even if he was unwilling to admit that 
sailing thousands of miles in order to blockade and shell an enemy coastline was not 
exactly true to the definition of a “defensive navy.”  A commerce navy was rejected by 
many Republicans in the 1790s, but now, in a new century, Republican citizens made it 
clear that they supported the commerce navy strategic vision.  Public support was now so 
strongly in favor of the commerce navy’s actions in the Mediterranean that Jefferson’s 
Federalist opponents had trouble criticizing him on his naval strategy.  The few editors 
who tried, like Alexander Young and Thomas Minns of The Mercury and New-England 
Palladium (Boston) had to resort to splitting hairs over the words used by the President in 
speeches celebrating the victories of his naval commanders in the Mediterranean.20 
 The attack on the Chesapeake on June 22, 1807, came on the heels of other 
British depredations including the episode the previous year when an American merchant 
sailor, John Pierce, was killed by a cannon shot from the HMS Leander in New York 
harbor (see chapter 4).  The Chesapeake-Leopard Affair involved the controversial 
British practice known as impressment, whereby British warships stopped American 
vessels, searched them for Royal Navy sailors who were skipping out on their 
enlistments.  If found, these sailors were returned to service in the Royal Navy, or as in 
the case of one of the four men seized on the Chesapeake only ten miles from Norfolk, 
Virginia, they were tried as deserters and hanged.  From the American perspective, not 
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only was American sovereignty challenged by such actions, but many times the 
impressed sailors were American citizens wrongfully accused of desertion.  From the 
British point of view, she was involved in a struggle for her very existence with 
Napoleon’s France and her chronic shortage of sailors was aggravated by American 
merchant vessels and warships that were illegally harboring deserting seamen.21  
Jefferson’s response to these growing threats along the American coast was to institute an 
embargo on December 22, 1807, while the same week Congress added to the coastal 
navy force consisting of galleys and gunboats.22  
 Predictably, the response from American citizens to the events taking place along 
their coast in 1806 and 1807 was one of outrage.   As an anonymous letter to the editor of 
the American Citizen demonstrated, Americans viewed the unprovoked attack on the 
Chesapeake as just “another proof of what we may expect from the British government, 
unless, foregoing all considerations but of our sovereignty and honor, we are resolved to 
right ourselves by resistance.”23  This unknown individual advocated “resistance,” but in 
the weeks following the Chesapeake-Leopard Affair, few ideas were offered in the 
popular sphere regarding how exactly that was to be done.  The U. S. Navy was ill-
equipped to defend the coast in any manner, and instead, as Samuel Harrison Smith, the 
editor of the National Intelligencer noted, merchants were showing “circumspection” by 
restraining the natural impulse to strike back at Britain.  Instead, Smith counseled them to 
continue to “repress their spirit of adventure, and run as few risks as possible.”24 
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 Newspapers are helpful in determining popular sentiment, but they do have their 
limitations, specifically if one is trying to find popular opinion about naval strategy. 
Public opinions regarding military or naval strategies are difficult to measure through the 
papers, although one can find examples of opposition to certain specific proposals, like 
the negative reaction by some when President Adams proposed allowing merchants to 
arm themselves in response to the threatening actions of the French Directory.25  Most 
entries in early American newspapers either announced that a ship had been seized at sea 
or reflected the incendiary reactions to flashpoints like the Chesapeake-Leopard Affair.  
Such articles are useful for determining the national mood amidst crisis-provoking 
episodes, but not as helpful in discerning any public will pertaining to what naval strategy 
the nation aught pursue.  For such an insight, we can follow the lead of recent scholarly 
work by William Anderson, Andrew Swan, and Frederick Leiner in exploring the role of 
American citizens who actively supported a naval force during the Quasi-War through 
subscription.26  This alternative way of discerning the naval thoughts of the American 
public examines how citizens from Newburyport, Massachusetts to Charleston, South 
Carolina built warships from 1798-1800 by utilizing the common eighteenth century 
method of the subscription list.  Used for building everything from highways in 
Pennsylvania to libraries in New England, American citizens discovered that 
subscriptions could be used effectively to augment the painfully slow congressional naval 
building project of 1794.   
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Subscription building projects built the Philadelphia (36 guns), New York (36 
guns), Essex (Essex/Salem, 32 guns), Boston (28 guns), John Adams (Charleston, 28 
guns), Merrimack (Newburyport, 24 guns), Baltimore (24 guns), Maryland (Baltimore, 
24 guns), and the Richmond (Richmond/Petersburg/ Manchester/ Norfolk, 16 guns) and 
constitute an important form of the public voice largely ignored or misconstrued by the 
historiography.27  Some historians have mischaracterized these private building projects 
as products of Congressional legislation enacted in June 30, 1798.  In reality, the citizens 
of Newburyport were already working on the first subscription in May 1798 and 
petitioning Congress for supporting legislation by early June.  By this time, notices such 
as the one that appeared in the June 1 edition of Philadelphia’s Aurora were appearing in 
many American papers and spurring cities all along the coast to follow the example of 
Newburyport, as 
The patriotic citizens of this town, determined to show their attachment to their 
own government, and to vindicate its commercial rights, have opened a 
subscription for the purpose of building a 20-gun ship:  and loaning her to 
government.  The sum proposed for building her, is 20,000 dollars.  Moses 
Brown, Esq. has patriotically subscribed 1500 dollars.  An example this, worthy 
prompt imitation.28 
 
Newburyport had been hit particularly hard by French privateers, having lost $682,000 
from seventy-seven merchant vessel seizures prior to 1800.29  The town had good reason 
to desire a commerce navy. 
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The so-called subscription ships entered service in the United States Navy from 
1798 to 1800, and ranged from ships that were built from the bottom-up according to the 
latest trends in naval architecture like the Philadelphia, to converted merchant vessels 
like the Baltimore.  They were built in small towns like Newburyport and large 
metropolises like New York, northern cities as well as southern cities, but the one thing 
they shared was that they were all voluntarily funded by private citizens who usually 
received government bonds rated at six percent annual interest in return.30 
 The amazing thing about these building projects, as Frederick Leiner notes, is that 
they were undertaken at a time when the United States Navy was very unimpressive and 
lacking in tangible governmental support.31  The Constitution, United States, and 
Constellation had not yet sailed, and American citizens could read congressional reports 
in newspapers that revealed that support for naval programs were hotly contested.32  In 
the summer of 1798, with concerns over war with France rising, the U.S. Navy consisted 
solely of the converted merchant vessel, the USS Ganges, which when it sailed out of 
Philadelphia on May 24, 1798, had the distinction of being the first warship put to sea 
since the reestablishment of the Navy with the Act of 1794.33  However, in spite of this 
lack of governmental support for a naval establishment and the high cost involved in 
constructing warships, citizens from New England, the mid-Atlantic, and South were all 
willing to invest in construction projects in exchange for an uncertain investment. 
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Secretary Stoddert was convinced these citizens were building ships “at a certain loss of 
their own money equal to 15 or 20 [percent] on the sum expended.”34 
 Who were the subscribers?  Complete lists remain for the Boston, Philadelphia, 
Richmond, and Essex, although only the Essex’s list makes any mention of the 
subscribers’ occupation.  While one might guess that the vast majority of the subscribers 
would be merchants, a quick perusal of the Essex’s list reveals that only 34 of the 101 
subscribers were either a merchant or trader.  Many occupations are represented on the 
list, including shipmasters, shopkeepers, a physician, a lawyer, a blacksmith, a tailor, and 
an apothecary.  These subscribers were a varied lot and they averaged $744.06 in 
subscribed contributions.35  While the Essex subscription list does not alter the fact that 
merchants were clearly the driving force behind the construction of private warships 
during the Quasi-War, it demonstrates that individuals from many walks of life were 
willing to do whatever they could to provide their republic with a naval force.  
  Finally, what do the subscription lists say about the popular conception of a 
republic’s naval strategy?  Obviously, these subscriber lists tell us little about how the 
ships were to be employed.  However, the ships supplied to the U. S. Navy averaged 28-
guns and fit well into President Adams’ concept of a cruising regional navy.  These were 
not capital ships meant to impress Europe, nor were they gunboats intended to ensure the 
coastal security of America’s coastline.  Instead, these subscription frigates and sloops-
of-war were built for the purpose of convoying American merchant vessels and 
countering the war on American commerce being waged by French warships and 
privateers.  As far as one can measure a popular voice, it is evident that a large number of 
                                                 
34 Naval Documents, IV: 32-33. 




merchants and many citizens of other professions as well, desired the benefits of a 
regional navy that could secure their coastline, escort merchant vessels throughout the 
West Indies, and strike back at the privateers.36 
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The first thirty years of America’s naval strategy was the product of worldwide 
events, internal politics, economic pressures, personal convictions, and Americans’ ideas 
of what a republic should be.  The ideas of republicanism surfaced repeatedly as 
representatives, presidents, and the public argued why their particular strategic vision of a 
navy best embodied the values of the American Revolution.  From 1782-1793 anti-navy 
policymakers held sway as the poor state of America’s finances and lack of external 
pressures provided little justification for a peacetime naval force.  The last ships of the 
Continental Navy were sold and the Articles of Confederation provided little authority for 
Congress to establish a new naval force.  The Constitution of 1787 granted this power to 
the legislature, but it was not until Portugal removed her ships from the mouth of the 
Mediterranean that advocates of a commerce navy were able to pass an act to build six 
frigates for the purpose of protecting overseas commerce.   
Peace with Algiers interrupted this building plan and the vision of a commerce 
navy gave way to the regional navy vision of John Adams.  From 1797 to 1800 this 
vision dealt with the threat to American commerce and coastal security posed by French 
privateers and warships by building frigates and sloops and dispatching them along the 
American coastline and the Caribbean and indirectly expanding the nations’ regional 
influence.  Citizens all along the American seaboard supported the regional navy by 
building frigates, brigs, and sloops to augment the Federal governments’ inconsistent 
building programs. Adams’ strategic vision faced competition from Benjamin Stoddert 
and other Federalists who envisioned a capital navy, and in 1799 their strategic vision 




This switch philosophically to a capital navy was short-lived and Adams himself 
admitted years later he regretted authorizing the six 74-gun ships.  Instead, the new 
century saw the United States return to the strategic vision of the commerce navy.  The 
new Republican president, Thomas Jefferson, ordered the remaining ships of the 
peacetime naval establishment act of 1801 to the Mediterranean after the Pasha of Tripoli 
declared war on the United States in May of 1801.  The commerce navy was America’s 
naval strategic vision until peace was made with Tripoli in 1805 and violations of 
America’s coastal sovereignty like the attack on the USS Chesapeake in 1807 led to the 
establishment of a coastal navy.  This strategic vision has been popularly conceptualized 
by the much-maligned gunboat and was more the product of congressional policymakers 
than President Jefferson.  Jefferson preferred a coastal navy, but one that was more 
complex and that would utilize ships-of-the-line, frigates, sloops, and gunboats.  The 
coastal navy dominated American strategic planning until the War of 1812, when the 
gunboats’ failure to prevent the Royal Navy from sailing up the Chesapeake led to the 
burning of Washington, D.C.  Events like this quickly led to the construction of ships-of-
the-line and the end of the coastal navy strategic vision. 
Events in North America, Europe and the Mediterranean form an important 
context to the debates over the founding of the U. S. Navy from 1783-1812.  However, it 
is important not to focus so heavily on the chronology of events that we lose sight of the 
coherency of the strategic visions being offered by policymakers for the establishment of 
commerce and coastal navies.  While domestic and international events provided the 
pressure to enact some form of policy, Congressional representatives advocated certain 




factors.  Additionally, by focusing on the diversity of policymakers’ strategic visions, we 
see that more color must be added to the “black and white” historiography of Federalists 
and Republicans during the first two decades of the new republic. 
What emerges from this recognition of a more complex debate over the purpose 
of a navy in the early national period is that policymakers were wrestling with the larger 
issues of republicanism amidst the discussion of a national defense.  Standing armies 
were feared, and yet despite this trepidation, during the early nineteenth century Congress 
invested millions into coastal defenses for fear of invasion.  The Founders were always 
hesitant, however, to invest significantly in a navy, so it was up to the policymakers to 
convince their peers why their particular naval vision best suited the needs and identity of 
a republic.  Everything the Founders did over the first thirty years of the United States 
was precedent-setting.  No one in modern times had attempted to establish a republican 
form of government on such a large scale, and many fully expected the American 
experiment to fail.  From the inauguration of President Washington to the resolution of 
the election crisis of 1800, the words and actions of the Founders would impact American 
government and society for generations.  The competing strategic visions of a republican 
navy-commerce navy, regional navy, capital navy, coastal navy-were equally important 
in determining the direction that America would take over the next century.  Navies were 
and are among the most expensive and complex organizations known to man, and these 
policymakers knew the importance of finding the right naval vision for the new nation as 




Timeline of Naval Acts and Appropriations 
 
August 1785 – Last ship of the Continental Navy, the Alliance, is sold 
 
March 27, 1794 – “An Act to provide a Naval Armament” authorizing four 44-gun 
frigates (United States, Constitution, President, and Constellation-a 38-gun ship) and 
two 36-gun frigates (Congress and Chesapeake) to be built to protect American 
commerce from Algerine corsairs  
 
June 5, 1794 – “An Act to authorize…a number of Vessels to be equipped as 
Galleys,” not exceeding ten 
 
April 20, 1796 – “An Act supplementary” to the March 27, 1794 act, allowing 
construction to continue on two 44-gun frigates (United States and Constitution) and 
one 36-gun frigate (Constellation, although she was actually a 38-gun frigate)  as a 
result of the peace settlement with the Dey of Algiers  
 
March 2, 1797 – The French Directory issues a decree targeting American commerce 
 
March 3, 1797 – “An Act making appropriations for…Naval establishments” 
providing extra funding for the completion of the United States, Constitution, and 
Constellation 
 
March 7, 1797 – President Adams learns that the French Directory refused to receive 
the United States’ Minister to France, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney 
 
July 1, 1797 – “An Act providing a Naval Armament” that allowed the United States, 
Constitution, and Constellation to be equipped, manned, and employed 
 
March 27, 1798 – “An Act for an additional appropriation…” to meet cost overruns 
of the United States, Constitution, and Constellation 
 
April 3, 1798 – President Adams releases the “XZY” dispatches to Congress 
 
April 27, 1798 – “An Act to provide an additional Armament” authorizes the 
purchase or building of up to twelve 22-gun vessels (including Adams, General 
Greene, George Washington, and Enterprise) 
 
April 30, 1798 – “An Act to establish an Executive department, to be denominated 
the Department of the Navy” 
 
May 4, 1798 – “An Act to authorize… a number of small vessels to be equipped as 






May 28, 1798 – “An Act to more effectually to protect the Commerce and Coasts” 
that authorized American commanders of armed vessels to capture any foreign armed 
vessel “found hovering on the coasts of the United States” for the purpose to seizing 
American commercial vessels 
 
June 25, 1798 – “An Act to authorize the defen[s]e of the Merchant Vessels” that 
allowed merchant vessels to arm and defend themselves against the search and 
seizure by French vessels 
 
June 30, 1798 – “An Act supplementary” that authorized the President to accept up to 
twelve publicly-financed vessels (New York – 36 guns, Philadelphia – 36 guns, Essex 
– 32 guns, John Adams – 28 guns, Boston – 28 guns, Merrimack – 24 guns, Baltimore 
– 24 guns, Maryland – 24 guns, Richmond – 16 guns) in exchange for government 
bonds (6 percent interest)  
 
July 9, 1798 – “An Act further to protect the Commerce” that authorized American 
commanders of public armed vessels in service of the U. S. to seize armed French 
vessels anywhere and also authorized the commissioning of privateers 
 
July 11, 1798 – “An Act for the establishing and organizing a Marine Corps” 
 
July 16, 1798 – “An act to make a further appropriation” for the completion and 
equipping of three ships of no less than 32-guns (President, Congress, and 
Chesapeake) 
 
February 25, 1799 – “An Act for the augmentation of the Navy” authorizing six 74-
gun ships-of-the-line to be built and six 18-gun sloops to be built or purchased 
 
February 26, 1801 – War declared on U.S. by Yusuf Karamanli, the Pasha of Tripoli  
 
March 3, 1801 – “An Act providing for a Naval peace establishment” that authorized 
selling all naval vessels except United States, Constitution, President, Constellation, 
Congress, Chesapeake, Philadelphia, New York, Boston, Essex, Adams, John Adams, 
and General Greene; six of the retained frigates were to be kept in constant peacetime 
service, while the other were to “be laid up in convenient ports” 
 
February 6, 1802 – “An Act for the protection of the Commerce” that authorized the 
President to “equip, officer, man, and employ” what vessels he deemed necessary to 
secure American commerce in the Mediterranean; also authorized commissioning 
privateers to seize any Tripolitan vessel 
 
February 28, 1803 – “An Act to provide an additional armament” that authorized 
building or purchasing four 16-gun sloops to protect Mediterranean commerce 
(Argus, Siren, Nautilus, Vixen) and ten gunboats  
 




April 21, 1806 – “An Act in addition to an act” that allowed the President to keep in 
service as many frigates and other vessels as he saw fit and lay up the rest 
 
June 18, 1807 -  USS Chesapeake is attacked by the HMS Leopard 
 
December 18, 1807 – “An Act to appropriate money for…Gun boats” that authorized 
the President to build or purchase up to 188 gun boats to protect the ports and harbors 
of the United States 
 
December 22, 1807 – “An Act laying an Embargo” against all foreign commerce 
 
January 31, 1809 – “An Act authorizing the employment of an additional naval force” 
that authorized the fitting out and manning of four frigates (United States, President, 
Essex, and John Adams) in addition to whatever other smaller vessels and gunboats 
the President deemed necessary for the defense of ports and the American coast 
 
March 30, 1812 – “An Act concerning the Naval Establishment” that authorized the 
repairing and equipping of the Constellation, Chesapeake, and Adams and the 
rebuilding of the Philadelphia, New York, Boston, and General Greene 
 






Late Eighteenth Century Ship Classifications 
 
Ship-of-the-line – A warship with multiple gun decks, powerful enough to assume a 
position in the “line of battle.”  The Royal Navy used the following rating system:  
first rate=100 or more guns (HMS Victory), second rate=90-98 guns, third rate = 64-
80 guns 
 
Frigate – A medium sized warship with one gun deck, for patrolling and escort duty.  
The Royal Navy system classified frigates:  fourth rate=50-60 guns (USS Constitution 
was often considered a fourth rate), fifth rate=32-40 guns, sixth rate=20-28 guns 
 
Sloop – A small warship carrying 10-18 guns. 
 
Brig – A small, 2-masted, square-rigged ship carrying 10-16 guns. 
 
Gunboat – A small, shallow-draft ship carrying one or more guns.  
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